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Have the Managers Finally Gotten It
Right?:
Federal Groundfish Management in
New England
Peter Shelley*
New England's fabled Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua)' came
under comprehensive U.S. management with the passage of the
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976.2 In the
* Peter Shelley, Esq., is Senior Counsel at Conservation Law Foundation, Inc.
He has worked on fisheries management issues in New England and
nationally since 1989. He gratefully acknowledges the research assistance
and drafting provided for parts of this article by Jeff Auger, Pace Law School,
and the excellent editing by Samantha Caravello, ocean program staff at
CLF. CLF would also like to acknowledge the Pew Charitable Trust's
longstanding support for CLF's groundfish management reform efforts; they
share our vision for a better future for New England's fish and fisheries.
1. E.g., MARK KURLANSKY, COD: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FISH THAT
CHANGED THE WORLD (1997). Atlantic cod has an extensive range, extending
north from Cape Hatteras to the Canadian border in the United States, and
then continuing across the northern Atlantic Ocean to the Bay of Biscay off
Spain and France. Atlantic cod are also found in the Barents Sea. BIGELOW
AND SCHROEDER'S FISHES OF THE GULF OF MAINE 233 (Bruce B. Collette &
Grace Klein-MacPhee eds., 3d ed. 2002).
2. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
265, 90 Stat. 331, 332-33 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1891d
(2006)). Prior to U.S. domestic management, the Atlantic cod off New
England's coast beyond twelve nautical miles were regulated internationally
under the authority of the International Commission for the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF). E.g., Emory D. Anderson, The History of
Fisheries Management and Scientific Advice - the ICNAF/NAFO History
from the End of World War II to the Present, 23 J. NORTHWEST ATLANTIC
21
22 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:21
intervening thirty-five years, this seminal federal law has been
scrutinized, condemned, praised, challenged, amended, and
interpreted repeatedly by fishermen and conservationists, fishery
managers and regulators, and courts and legislators but the
challenge of achieving a viable and sustainable fishery for Atlantic
cod remains. The latest fishery stock assessments, while positive
for a number of fish species in the New England groundfish
complex, 3 were not sanguine with respect to either the Georges
Bank or the Gulf of Maine Atlantic cod stocks, 4 putting spawning-
aged biomass at 11.9% and 21% respectively of what would be
associated with a maximum sustainable yield from the stock.5
Moreover, Georges Bank Atlantic cod is not projected to be rebuilt
until 2026 even with highly restrictive fishing controls. 6 Thus, the
FISHERIES SCI. 75 passim (1998), available at http://journal.nafo.int/
J23/anderson.pdf.
3. The groundfish complex in New England is thirteen species,
managed as twenty stocks. Other fish that would generally be considered
"groundfish," that is, fish that spend their adult lives on or near the bottom of
the ocean, such as monkfish or spiny dogfish, are currently managed
separately.
4. These are the same species because there are significant exchanges
between the onshore and the offshore populations of cod but they are
managed in New England as if they were separate stocks of fish. There
remain significant questions about the structure of the New England cod
populations that are just being investigated now. Failure to properly account
for cod population structure is one of the hypotheses explaining the poor
performance of the cod stock assessment mode.
5. See NOAA Fisheries Serv., Assessment of 19 Northeast Groundfish
Stocks through 2007, Presentation to New England Fishery Management
Council (Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://www.nefmc.org/nemulti/council_
mtg-docs/Sept%202008/080903 Final%20GARM%20PresentationPaul%20R
ago.pdf [hereinafter Assessment of 19 Northeast Groundfish Stocks]. These
biomass estimates have to be understood in the context that there is still a
great deal of scientific uncertainty with the population models that are used
for this stock.
6. E.g., NEW ENG. FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, FINAL AMENDMENT 16 To
THE NORTHEAST MULTISPECIES FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN 7 (October 16,
2009), available at http://www.nefmc.org/nemulti/planamen/Amendl6/
finalamendl6_oct09.html, [hereinafter FINAL AMENDMENT 16]. For the
final rule promulgating Amendment 16, see 75 Fed. Reg. 18,262 (Apr. 9,
2010) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 902, 50 C.F.R. pt. 648). Gulf of Maine
Atlantic cod were on track to being rebuilt by 2014 and were declared to be no
longer overfished in 2010, but a recent stock assessment has thrown the past
assessments into limbo as the scientists now think that earlier projections of
rapid regrowth were wrong. The decision process associated with changing
the 2014 rebuilding deadline for Gulf of Maine cod is underway.. See Abby
Goodnough, Scientists Say Cod Are Scant; Nets Say Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES
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current status of the once-sacred cod 7 presents a dubious metric of
the success of the fisheries management program since 1976.
This article will continue a series of legal and policy analyses
Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) has conducted, looking at the
challenges of rebuilding and protecting sustainable fish
populations at levels that are capable of providing reliable annual
catch levels and supporting a economically viable, thriving, and
diverse regional fishery in New England.8 The focus of the
analysis here will proceed from the recent enactment of the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Reauthorization Act (Magnuson Reauthorization Act),9 to the
judicial review of the promulgation of regulations implementing
Amendment 16 to the Northeast Multispecies (Groundfish)
Fishery Management Plan ("Amendment 16 FMP").
I. BACKGROUND
The legislative course of U.S. fisheries management is marked
by three major congressional actions: the original Fishery
Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA),'o the
Sustainable Fisheries Act (SFA) enacted in 1996,11 and the
Magnuson Reauthorization Act.12 This article will refer to the
(Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/us/conflicting-indicators-
on-gulf-of-maine-cod-stocks.html?hp.
7. There is a famous wooden carving of the Atlantic cod that is known
as the "Sacred Cod" in the Massachusetts State House. For a short history of
this iconic carving, see KURLANSKY, supra note 1, at 79.
8. Peter Shelley et al., The New England Fisheries Crisis: What Have
We Learned?, 9 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 221 passim (1996); Roger Fleming et al.,
Twenty-Eight Years and Counting: Can the Magnuson-Stevens Act Deliver on
Its Conservation Promise?, 28 VT. L. REV. 579 passim (2004). Conservation
Law Foundation staff also wrote a related article on marine habitat
protection. Roger Fleming & John D. Crawford, Habitat Protection under the
Magnuson-Stevens Act: Can It Really Contribute to Ecosystem Health in the
Northwest Atlantic?, 12 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 43 passim (2006).
9. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3575 (2007) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.A. and 33 U.S.C.A.).
10. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (2006)).
11. Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (1996)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
12. Magnuson- Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3575 (2007) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.A. and 33 U.S.C.A.).
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collective results of these and other minor Congressional tweaks
to the original FCMA as the "Magnuson-Stevens Act." In addition
to the monumentally important and internationally influential
assertion of exclusive fishery management control over the 200-
mile fishery conservation zones by the FCMA,13 the driving force
of the Magnuson-Stevens Act for policy purposes has been the
National Standards for fishery management set forth in the Act,
pursuant to which all fishery management plans are required to
conform. 14
Of these standards, the most elusive in execution in New
England, especially for our friend the Atlantic cod, has been
National Standard 1, which constructs the Scylla and Charybdis
of fisheries management: achieving optimum yield from a stock
while preventing overfishing.15  The persistent difficulties in
implementing National Standard 1 are ironic given the key role
that National Standard 1 was always designed to play in
producing sustainable levels of fish and thriving fisheries. The
original FCMA conference report states: "[t]he first of these
national standards is regarded by the conferees as being of
particular importance. It declares that conservation and
management measures shall be designed, implemented, and
enforced to prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing
basis, the optimum yield from each fishery."16
Over the ensuing 35 years, fishery management councils and
federal regulators alike have struggled to understand how to
reconcile these often competing objectives: preventing overfishing
while achieving so-called "optimum yield" from the fishery on a
continuous basis.17 If the best available science indicated that a
13. Fishery Conservation and Management Act, § 101, 90 Stat. at 336.
President Reagan later expanded the scope of this 200-mile jurisdiction to
include other activities and national interests in addition to fishing, and the
zones were renamed Exclusive Economic Zones. See Proclamation 5030, 48
Fed. Reg. 10,605, 10,605-06 (Mar. 10, 1983); see also Act of Nov. 14, 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-659, § 101(a), 100 Stat. 3706, 3706 (adding definition of
"exclusive economic zone").
14. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a) (2006).
15. See 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2006).
16. S. REP. No. 94-711, at 50. (1976) (Conf. Rep.).
17. The FCMA at that time defined "optimum yield" (OY) as achieving
the "greatest overall benefit to the Nation, with particular reference to food
production and recreational opportunities," and "which is prescribed as such
on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield from such fishery, as modified
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manager could not simultaneously achieve both objectives in a
particular complex of fish that was being managed, was one more
important than the other? Some favored weighing the economic
objectives over the ecological objectives, particularly in the short
term; others saw the purposes of the law requiring placing the
ecological objectives first. In New England, it took a lawsuit to
resolve the point. National Standard 1 created a conservation
floor: overfishing had to be prevented and on-going overfishing
had to be stopped.' 8
The second major Congressional intervention in fisheries
management occurred in 1996 with passage of the SFA.19 The
1996 amendments focused on several structural elements of the
FCMA that were confounding the Congressional goals of achieving
sustainable fisheries in the United States. The SFA established a
biological cap on setting of the optimal yield for a fishery
regardless of the social or economic consequences of that cap; 20 it
added a new National Standard to reduce bycatch;21 and it
mandated that regional fisheries management councils and the
federal agencies develop comprehensive measures that "minimize
to the extent practicable [the] adverse effects" of fishing on
essential fish habitat. 22
As with the conservation provisions of the original FC1IA23
however, these new conservation objectives had to await judicial
by any relevant economic, social, or ecological factor." Fishery Conservation
and Management Act § 3 (emphasis added).
18. See Conservation Law Found. of New Eng. v. Franklin, 989 F.2d 54,
61 (1st Cir. 1993). See generally Shelley et al., supra note 8 (discussing the
first federal litigation brought under the Magnuson-Stevens Act to directly
enforce National Standard 1).
19. Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (1996)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
20. The SFA amended the definition of "optimum yield" to eliminate the
option of allowing fishing rates higher than the estimated maximum
sustainable yield, even if they were justified by relevant economic or social
factors: OY "prescribed on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield . . . as
reduced by any relevant.. . factor." 16 U.S.C. § 1802(33)(B) (2006) (emphasis
added). See also Fleming et al., supra note 8, at 586-87.
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (2006) (defining "bycatch" as "fish which are
harvested in a fishery, but which are not sold or kept for personal use").
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(7) (2006).
23. See generally Shelley et al., supra note 8 (discussing the first federal
litigation brought directly under the Magnuson-Stevens Act to enforce its
overfishing objectives).
25
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review before being fully implemented in New England. CLF and
others sued the Secretary of the Department of Commerce on May
19, 2000, alleging that the groundfish management plans from the
New England Fishery Management Council ("New England
Council" or "Council") failed to properly implement the new SFA
conservation measures. 24 Specifically, the conservation plaintiffs
argued that Amendment 9 to the Northeast Multispecies
(Groundfish) Fishery Management Plan ("Amendment 9 FMP")
set the overfishing definitions too high, allowed overfishing to
continue, violated the rebuilding requirements for depleted stocks,
and failed to implement the new requirements to minimize
bycatch and discards. 25  As a result, plaintiffs argued, the
National Marine Fisheries Service's (NMFS) 26 approval of such
plans violated the law. Plaintiffs again prevailed on all counts.27
The Amendment 9 FMP litigation was quickly followed by the
adoption of Amendment 13 to the Northeast Multispecies
(Groundfish) Fishery Management Plan ("Amendment 13 FMP"),
which was already being developed by the New England Council
during the course of the Amendment 9 litigation. The
Amendment 13 FMP went into effect May 1, 2004, and further
changed the underlying fishery management plan. Conservation
groups and commercial fishing interests challenged the
amendment in a multi-party court fight. 28 The conservationists
challenged the amendment on the grounds that the regulations
allowed continued overfishing on some stocks during their
rebuilding period, which the groups concluded was still in
24. See Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.
2001); Fleming et al., supra note 8, at 590-97.
25. Conservation Law Found., 209 F. Supp. 2d at 8.
26. The Magnuson-Stevens Act delegates authority to the Secretary of
Commerce to implement the law. This delegation, in turn, has been
delegated to the NMFS by the Secretary. Courts continue, however, to refer
to the Secretary of Commerce as the ultimate decision-maker. E.g., Oceana,
Inc. v. Evans, No. 04-0811, 2005 WL 555416, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2005).
27. Conservation Law Found., 209 F. Supp. 2d at 11-15; see also Fleming
et al., supra at note 8, at 590-97 (discussing the course of the litigation
including the complex remedial phase).
28. Oceana, Inc., 2005 W.L. 555416, at *1-6. For an expanded treatment
of Amendment 13 up to the point of litigation, see Fleming et al., supra note
8, at 597-605. Summary judgment for the government was granted on the
basis of mootness in a separate procedural challenge that was made to
Amendment 13 by Associated Fisheries of Maine. Associated Fisheries of Me.
v. Evans, 350 F. Supp. 2d 247, 256-57 (D. Me. 2004).
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violation of National Standard 1; that the probability of
overfishing was unacceptably high; that the amendment failed to
minimize bycatch or adopt an adequate bycatch reporting
methodology; and that the amendment violated the National
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h.29
The conservation plaintiffs did not fare as well in this
challenge. On the issue of whether a "phased-in" elimination of
overfishing was legal, the court concluded: "CLF confuses the
statutory bar on exceeding the [maximum sustainable yield]
amount with a nonexistent prohibition on exceeding the Fmsy rate
during a rebuilding program."30 The court continued: "so long as
[optimum yield] is achieved over time and rebuilding targets can
be met within the statutory period, the Secretary [of Commerce]
enjoys significant latitude in designing a rebuilding program and
in ending overfishing."31 The court concluded: "it was
permissible. . . to take into account 'the needs of fishing
communities' in establishing the rebuilding framework and in
setting the timetable for ending overfishing."32 As a result of this
reading of the law, a pivotal issue that CLF and others thought
had been put to rest in an earlier decision 33 once more became a
confounding factor in sorting out an appropriate balance between
fish and fishermen.
The court also ruled against the conservation plaintiffs with
respect to their challenges to the likelihood of success of the
29. Oceana, Inc., 2005 W.L. 555416, at *5. Oceana also brought a claim
challenging Amendment 13 for alleged failures to protect essential fish
habitat (EFH). Id. This claim was follow-up litigation to a case that
American Oceans Campaign (now Oceana) commenced in 1999 with respect
to the identification and protection of essential fish habitat in a number of
fishery management plans around the United States, including the New
England Council's Omnibus Habitat Amendment. Am. Oceans Campaign v.
Daley, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2000). The court there held that while
the EFH analysis met the Magnuson-Stevens Act requirements at the time, it
violated the National Environmental Policy Act by failing to adequately
address alternatives. Id. at 12. Habitat protection as required by the
Magnuson-Stevens Act continues to be a failure in New England but is
beyond the scope of this article.
30. Oceana, Inc., 2005 W.L. 555416, at *12.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1, at 8, 15
(D.D.C. 2001).
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rebuilding plans,34 the question of NEPA inadequacy, 35 and the
essential fish habitat claims. 36  The court granted summary
judgment to the conservation groups on their claims that
Amendment 13 failed with respect to its bycatch reporting
methodology methods and protocols.37  The fishing group that
challenged the Amendment 13 FMP suffered a similar fate,
prevailing only on a narrow, albeit important, procedural
challenge it mounted to protect the council's management
-38prerogatives.
This decision was very disappointing to conservationists and
to a significant degree set the stage for the conservation agenda in
the congressional reauthorization debates that were to come up
shortly. Clearly, the Magnuson-Stevens Act language was still
not tight enough to ensure that fishery-management plans would
produce sustainable fisheries as quickly as practicable, a central
element of its stated purposes. 39 Congress had intended the SFA
to end overfishing and rebuild stocks, but instead regulators and
managers continued to interpret provisions in the SFA to allow
overfishing during rebuilding, greatly increasing the risks, if not
the reality, that the widespread overfished status of many of the
Nation's fish populations would continue far beyond the 10-year
endpoint originally envisioned.40
II. THE FIGHT FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE MAGNUSON-STEVENS
FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT REAUTHORIZATION ACT
The third major intervention by Congress with fisheries
management was the 2007 passage of the Magnuson-Stevens
Reauthorization Act.41 This reauthorization may well represent a
sort of "final chapter" as far as refining the major structural
34. Oceana, Inc., 2005 WL 555416, at *16-20.
35. Id. at *20-21.
36. Id. at *27-37.
37. Id. at *43.
38. Id. at 21-27.
39. See Cat Lazaroff, Sustainable Fisheries Act Failing to Protect Fish,
ENVTL. NEWS SERVICE (Oct. 11, 2001), http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/
oct2001/2001-10-11-06.asp.
40. S. Rep. No. 109-229, at 22 (2006).
41. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3575 (2007) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.A. and 33 U.S.C.A.).
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elements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act is concerned;42 Congress
certainly seemed intent at a minimum on putting an end to the
lengthy interpretative process that began in 1976 on the topic of
preventing overfishing. The Magnuson Reauthorization Act
conclusively weights biological considerations more than social
and economic factors in the situation of overfished stocks,
recognizing that healthy, sustainable fisheries are dependent in
the long term on healthy fish populations. Continued overfishing,
even in the short term, is not in the Nation's interest.
For the conservation community in New England, the
Magnuson Reauthorization Act's legislative process focused on
defending the SFA's improvements, ensuring that overfishing
would stop in all New England fisheries, requiring accountability
measures for the catch limits that were being set by the New
England Council, and taking some of the politics out of fisheries
science and science recommendations at the council level. This
last piece was done by requiring all councils to have science and
statistical committees (SSC) and by decreasing the latitude of
councils to ignore or modify the advice from these expert
committees. These efforts were largely successful and the
reauthorized law improved considerably on the existing statutory
framework.
Several provisions in the reauthorized law were particularly
notable with respect to the situation in New England. First,
annual catch limits (ACLs) were required to be set for all stocks in
the management unit and these annual catch limits had to have
strict accountability measures that would ensure that the fishery
did not overshoot the limit during the fishing year.43 The ACLs
had to ensure that no overfishing would occur in any stock in the
fishery." For any stock already subject to overfishing, the new
restrictive ACLs had to be in place by the start of the 2010 fishing
year; for all others, the ACLs had to be in place by the start of the
42. This optimistic view that the law is safe from major adjustments
may be thwarted by a number of bills recently introduced in the 112th
Congress, 1st Session, in the U.S. House of Representatives that seek to re-
introduce "flexibility" into fishery management, particularly with respect to
setting the rebuilding schedules for overfished fish stocks. See H.R. 1646,
2304, 2772, & 3061, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011) (all currently before the
Committee on Natural Resources in the House).
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(15) (2006).
44. See id. H§ 1853(a)(10), 1853(a)(15), 1854(e).
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2011 fishing year.45 Second, the ACLs were to be set pursuant to
scientific calculations of the allowable biological catch prepared by
each council's SSC, calculations that were not subject to second-
guessing by the council. 46  Later-adopted National Standard 1
guidelines further specified that the allowable biological catch had
to be reduced by the scientific and management uncertainties
present in the fishery.47
Congress rejected the use or tolerance of overfishing as a
management tool in the Magnuson Reauthorization Act, even in
the short-run:
The goal of the Magnuson-Stevens Act should be to
produce MSY "on a continuing basis" in order to end
overfishing and rebuild fisheries within a reasonable
period of time. To achieve this goal, plans must establish
a reasonable end-date for fishing beyond sustainable
levels, particularly because it is necessary to ensure that
overfishing during the rebuilding period will not
undermine rebuilding goals.48
The Magnuson Reauthorization Act strengthened existing law
and Congress stood up to the fishing interests that wanted to scale
back the conservation measures during the reauthorization
process. As one of the principal Congressional architects put it,
"[w]hile the pending measure does not do everything I would have
liked, it does not roll back the conservation principles in this
important fisheries management law. The legislation actually
strengthens the Magnuson-Stevens Act."49
Under the Magnuson Reauthorization Act, ACLs and
accountability measures (AMs) were mandated for all fishery
management plans. The act first amends section 303(a)(15) of the
Magnuson-Stevens Act to include the words "establish a
45. Id. § 1853.
46. See id. §§ 1852(g)(1)(B) & (h)(6) (2006); 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(f) (2009).
47. 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(g)(2) (2009).
48. S. REP. No. 109-229, at 22 (2006).
49. 152 CONG. REC. E2243 (daily ed. Dec. 27, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Nick J. Rahall II); see also Constantine G. Papvizas & Lawrence I. Kiern,
2005-2006 U.S. Maritime Legislative Developments, 38 J. 1AR. L. & COM. 267,
290 (2007) ("The reauthorized Magnuson-Stevens Act builds on the structure
of the original act and the 1996 amendments by setting a firm deadline to
end overfishing . . . .").
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mechanism for specifying annual catch limits in the plan
(including a multiyear plan), implementing regulations, or annual
specifications, at a level such that overfishing does not occur in
the fishery, including measures to ensure accountability."50
Moreover, as noted above, managers had a strict timeline for
putting these ACLs and AMs in place: fishing year 2010 for
overfished fisheries and fishing year 2011 for all others.51
These forcing and clarifying functions of the act were
heralded by conservationists: "Congress' latest revamping moves
in the right direction. First, the [Magnuson Reauthorization Act]
clarifies and strengthens existing stock rebuilding provisions by
requiring Councils to actually implement required plans and
regulations to end overfishing of stocks declared over-fished.
Moreover, such plans and regulations must now provide for
ending overfishing immediately."52 By imposing strict time limits
and requiring the ACLs be developed based on scientific advice,
the Magnuson Reauthorization Act prevented councils from
continually re-defining stock specifications to allow overfishing.53
This act drastically changed the fisheries landscape in New
England, where overfishing was still being tolerated under the
authority of the decision in Oceana, Inc. As the Washington, D.C.-
based Marine Fish Conservation Network observed: "Congress
also closed a loophole allowing overfishing to continue on species
already classified as overfished. The new law specifies that
rebuilding plans - plans managers must develop to restore species
declared overfished - must end overfishing immediately and not
50. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-479, sec. 104, § 303(a), 120 Stat.
3575, 3584 (2007).
51. Id.
52. Madeline June Kass, Fishery Conservation and Management Act
Reauthorization: "A"for effort, "C" for Substance, 21 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T
52, 52-53 (2007).
53. "[O]verfished" and "overfishing" are defined in the Magnuson-
Stevens Act as "a rate or level of fishing mortality that jeopardizes the
capacity of a fishery to produce the maximum sustainable yield on a
continuing basis." 16 U.S.C. § 1802(34) (2006). The National Marine and
Fisheries Service has clarified these terms so that "overfished" defines the
biomass of the stock while "overfishing" pertains to the rate or level of
removal of fish from the stock. Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions; Annual
Catch Limits; National Standard Guidelines, 73 Fed. Reg. 32,526, 32,532
(June 9, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 600).
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continue, as has been the case most notably in New England
where plans to restore species have dragged on for years."54
Furthermore, the practice of consequence-free annual quota
overruns, which were a chronic outcome in New England, was
eliminated by the AM requirements. Councils were to use a range
of measures, including: (1) those that apply in-season and are
designed to prevent the fishery from ever exceeding the ACL in
the first place and (2) those measures that would be applied after
a fishing year which caused an ACL overage to both pay back the
overage and to ensure it did not happen in subsequent years.55 if
ACLs are exceeded, new AMs must be implemented within the
next year, or as soon as possible.56 These new requirements are
designed to remove all incentives to overfishing from the fishery:
"[tihe clear intent of Congress in the [Magnuson Reauthorization
Act] is to end overfishing by requiring catch limits and enforcing
those limits through accountability measures."57
To further aid in preventing overfishing, the Magnuson
Reauthorization Act prescribed protocols for developing the
annual catch specifications that de-politicized the use of science in
the council process.5 8 The act required councils to establish and
use an SSC: "Each scientific and statistical committee shall
provide its Council ongoing scientific advice for fishery
management decisions, including recommendations for acceptable
biological catch, preventing overfishing, maximum sustainable
yield, and achieving rebuilding targets, and reports on ...
sustainability of fishing practices." 59 Members of the SSC "shall
54. MARINE FISH CONSERVATION NETWORK, A NEW COURSE FOR AMERICA'S
FISH AND FISHERMEN 7 (2007), available at http://www.conservefish.org/
storage/marinefish3/documents/mfcn new course.report 07.pdf.
55. Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions; Annual Catch Limits; National
Standard Guidelines, 73 Fed. Reg. at 32,535.
56. Id.
57. A NEW COURSE FOR AMERICA'S FISH AND FISHERMEN, supra note 54.
58. "Despite the reforms to the MSA in 1996 (known as the Sustainable
Fisheries Act, or SFA) aimed at ending overfishing, fishery managers
frequently ignored scientific advice and unsustainable levels of fishing were
permitted to continue without hard catch limits in many U.S. Fisheries."
MARINE FISH CONSERVATION NETWORK, TAKING STOCK 2011: AN UPDATE ON
EFFORTS To END OVERFISHING IN U.S. FISHERIES 3 (2011), available at
http://www.conservefish.org/storage/marinefish3/documents/takingstock
2011.pdf.
59. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-479, sec. 103(b), § 302(g), 120
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be [flederal employees, [s]tate employees, academicians, or
independent experts and shall have strong scientific or technical
credentials and experience[,]" 60 and a peer review process could
also be established to provide the council with further scientific
advice.61 Councils have to adopt ACLs that do not exceed the
levels recommended by the SSCs or the peer review process.62
By mandating that SSC committees must be comprised of
qualified and competent individuals and by requiring that the
scientific advice serve as an absolute cap on quotas, Congress
attempted to ensure that accurate information is both provided to
and, more importantly, utilized by the councils when developing
fishery management plans. Congress inserted these provisions
because it recognized the detrimental effect that ignoring
scientific recommendations was having on fisheries: "ten years
after enactment of the [Sustainable Fisheries Act], overfishing is
still occurring in a number of fisheries, even those fisheries under
a rebuilding plan established early in the SFA implementation
process."63 In addition to the ACL and AM requirements,
Congress mandated a more prominent role for science in all
council processes.64 Prior to these mandates, the New England
Council used to have long discussions about what the science
advice meant and even felt free to ignore it. Indeed, the New
England Council did not even have a functional SSC prior to
passage of the Magnuson Reauthorization Act. The Magnuson
Stat. 3575, 3580 (2007).
60. Id. Independent members can also be paid a stipend, in the hopes
that "Councils attract ... qualified experts to serve on SSCs who otherwise
may not have the funding necessary to enable them to perform the required
work." S. REP. No. 109-229, at 18 (2006).
61. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Reauthorization Act of 2006 § 103(b), 120 Stat. at 3580.
62. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(6) (2006).
63. S. REP. No. 109-229, at 6. (2006). S. 2012 was introduced in the
109th Congress and passed the U.S. Senate on June 19, 2006. It was never
taken up in the U.S. House of Representatives in that session. Identical
language was taken up by the House of Representatives in the second session
of the 109' Congress as H.R. 5946, passed the House on September 27, 2006,
passed the Senate on December 7, 2006, with amendments, which were
agreed to by the House on December 9, 2006. President Bush signed it into
law on January 7, 2007. See Bill Summary & Status: H.R. 5496, THE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:
HR05946:@@@S (last visited Sept. 17, 2011).
64. S. REP. No. 109-229, at 7.
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Reauthorization Act eliminates the politics that inevitably
interfered with the manager's long-term objectives of producing
and maintaining sustainable fisheries: "[t]he new provisions
significantly constrain the councils' ability to ignore the advice of
SSCs and establish an independent peer review process for
evaluating the quality of that advice."65
In discussing the need for these new measures, the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation reported
the following:
[Slome regions argued that with proper accountability
safeguards, effort controls could achieve the same results
with less disruption to the fishery. However, the
Committee concluded that explicit direction is needed to
ensure accountability in all regions. After numerous
meetings and discussions with the Councils, industry,
and conservation groups, the Committee determined that,
to ensure compliance with the 1996 amendments, S. 2012
needed to require that: (1) scientifically established
annual catch limits be set and adhered to in each
managed fishery and (2) any catch in excess of that limit
(overages) should be deducted from the following year's
catch limit through appropriate management measures.66
The Magnuson Reauthorization Act was another legislative
step in the right direction. After its enactment, the focus
immediately turned to NMFS, which was charged with
interpreting and implementing these new requirements.
III. REVISING THE NATIONAL STANDARD GUIDELINES
Since the Magnuson Reauthorization Act significantly altered
National Standard 1, new interpretive guidelines were required.
These guidelines were of particular concern to conservationists,
who still saw a number of ways that congressional intent could go
astray in the guideline promulgation process. 67  NMFS filed a
65. A NEW COURSE FOR AMERICA'S FISH AND FISHERMEN, supra note 54, at
13.
66. S. REP. No. 109-229, at 7.
67. A NEW COURSE FOR AMERICA'S FISH AND FISHERMEN, supra note 54, at
8 ("NMFS guidelines and regulations will be key to addressing these concerns
directly when setting annual catch limits.").
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notice of intent (NOI) to prepare an environmental impact
statement for the impending guidelines it planned to write for
National Standard 1.68 National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) later proposed a rule for ACLs on June 9,
2008.69 Over the course of the next three months, NMFS held
three public meetings and made formal presentations to each
regional fishery management council. It received over 158,000
comments involving the proposed National Standard 1 guidelines
revisions.70  The final guidance was published on January 16,
2009.'
The final guidance rule constituted a major re-write of the
previous National Standard 1 guidelines. 72 NMFS incorporated
the directives from Congress by mandating that all fishery
management plans must contain ACLs and have AMs.73 The rule
further provided that "ACLs in coordination with AMs must
prevent overfishing[.]"74 AMs should "address and minimize both
the frequency and magnitude of overages" "of the ACL if they
occur."75  Accountability measures are further described in
subpart (g) where NMFS details in-season accountability
measures, suggests using annual catch targets76 to ensure an ACL
level is not breached, and requires that in situations where "an
ACL was exceeded, AMs must be triggered and implemented as
soon as possible to correct the operational issue that caused the
68. National Standard 1 Guidelines; Notice of Intent to Prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement, 72 Fed. Reg. 7016, 7017 (Feb. 14, 2007).
This proposal was later abandoned as NMFS determined a categorical
exclusion was appropriate for the action.
69. Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions; Annual Catch Limits; Nat'l
Standard Guidelines Proposed Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 32,526 (June 9, 2008) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 600).
70. Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions; Annual Catch Limits; Nat'l
Standard Guidelines Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 3178, 3178 (Jan. 16, 2009) (to
be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 600).
71. Id.
72. Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions; Annual Catch Limits; Nat'l
Standard Guidelines Proposed Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 32,537 ("[T]his proposed
rule would revise § 600.310 in its entirety.").
73. 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(c) (2010).
74. 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(f)(5)(i).
75. 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(g)(1).
76. These annual catch targets were voluntary and portrayed as sort of a
gravel warning strip that alerted managers that an ACL overage was likely.
35
36 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:21
ACL overage."" The ACL and AM mechanisms are highly
detailed and quite specific.7 8
NMFS also clarified how numerous fishing terms related to
each other, settling on a tiered approach where the overfishing
limit (OFL) is greater or equal to the acceptable biological catch
(ABC), which is greater than or equal to the ACL.79 The
difference between the OFL and ABC "depends on how scientific
uncertainty is accounted for;" the difference between the ABC and
the ACL is the estimated management uncertainty.80 The SSCs
were to be responsible for determining the ABC, thus implicitly
vesting in the scientists any calculation of the scientific
uncertainty of the OFL calculation. The councils were then to set
the ACLs based on that scientific advice, after they had further
reduced the ABC by the council's estimate of the management
uncertainty with respect to achieving the ACL with the
management measures they were proposing.8 1
Not only did the new provisions in the Magnuson
Reauthorization Act require the National Standard 1 guidelines to
be rewritten, but the act also affected other guidelines and
regulations. The National Standard 8 and 9 guidelines both
underwent minor changes. 82  NMFS also implemented new
77. 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(g)(3).
78. 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(h)(1).
79. Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions; Annual Catch Limits; Nat'l
Standard Guidelines Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 3178, 3180 (Jan. 16, 2009) (to
be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 600). NMFS went further to clarify that there
were very few fisheries where setting all of these standards as equal to each
other would be appropriate. Id.
80. Id.
81. Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions; Annual Catch Limits; Nat'l
Standard Guidelines Proposed Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 32,526, 32,533 (June 9,
2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 600).
82. General Provision of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Act; Minor Amendments to Regulations Final Rule, 73 Fed.
Reg. 67,809, 67,810 (Nov. 17, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 600).
National Standard 8 (section 600.345) was modified to add "that fishery
conservation and management measures take into account the importance of
fishery resources to fishing communities by using economic and social data
that is based on the best scientific information available." Id. National
Standard 9 (section 600.350) was also modified "by reformatting paragraph
(c), the definition, and adding an exclusion of 'bycatch' scientifically tagged
and released highly migratory species fish harvested in a commercial fishery
managed by a Council or the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Convention Implementation Act." Id.
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guidelines to establish the new Council Coordinating Committee
and to set up SSC operating procedures. 83
Back in New England, the New England Fishery
Management Council was already deeply engaged in developing
Amendment 16 to the Northeast Multispecies (Groundfish)
Fishery Management Plan ("Amendment 16 FMP") and now
needed to bring it into compliance with the new law and
guidelines.
IV. AMENDMENT 16 TO NEW ENGLAND'S GROUNDFISH FMP
The New England Council formally commenced Amendment
16 to the Northeast Multispecies FMP on November 6, 2006,84
while the reauthorization process was still under way in Congress.
The Council had already determined several years earlier during
the Amendment 13 FMP process and in discussions after adoption
of Amendment 13 that Amendment 16 was to be a major
amendment that would introduce a number of significant
management changes into the fishery. First, since this
amendment was happening at the mid-point of many of the
rebuilding programs for the twelve overfished stocks, the Council
intended to use it to adjust catch rates up or down to ensure that
all fish stocks stayed on a proper rebuilding trajectory.85 For most
of these rebuilding stocks, the New England Council's objective
was to have them rebuilt by 2014.86 Second, the Council had
already signaled that groundfish management in New England
would be shifting to a "hard quota" management system.8 7  In
conjunction with this shift to hard quotas, the Council indicated
83. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act;
Regional Fishery Management Councils; Operations Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg.
59,143, 59,143 (Sept. 27, 2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 600).
84. Fisheries of the Northeastern United States; Northeast Multispecies
Fishery, Scoping Process, 71 Fed. Reg. 64,941 (Nov. 6, 2006).
85. Id. at 64,942.
86. Id. Our friend, the Georges Bank Atlantic cod, however, is on a
much longer rebuilding timeline. Because of biological factors, the scientists
had calculated that this stock would not be rebuilt until 2026. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 1854(e)(4)(A)(ii) (2006) (setting maximum rebuilding period of ten years
unless "the biology of the stock of fish" dictates otherwise).
87. Unlike the status quo indirect control system, see Anderson, supra
note 2, a hard quota system is a direct control system where the main
conservation mechanism is the setting of a total amount of fish to be caught,
after which the fishery closes.
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that it would analyze new management mechanisms and
approaches, including individual quota systems, area
management systems, expansions of the existing pilot sector
management systems,88 and total allowable catch systems. 89 The
New England Council expected to have the Amendment 16 FMP
in place by the start of the 2009 fishing year, May 1, 2009,
although the public notice itself foreshadowed some of the
challenges that lay ahead with such an ambitious schedule,
including the fact that the new science assessments for the stocks
managed under Amendment 16 were not scheduled to be
completed until mid-2008. 90
In the comments in response to the Amendment 16 FMP
scoping notice, the New England Council received strong feedback
of community interest in a number of management systems:
continuation of the current "days-at-sea" program;91 an area-based
88. The Council had established a pilot program for sector-based
management in Amendment 13. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Act Provisions; Fisheries of the Northeastern United
States; Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 13 Final Rule, 69
Fed. Reg. 22,906, 22,981-83 (April 27, 2004) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
648). This first look at a sector management approach where fishermen
could form organizations that fished as groups was spearheaded by a group of
Cape Cod fishermen from Chatham, Massachusetts, known as the Georges
Bank Cod Hook Sector. Amendment 13 allocated this sector a quota based on
its 1996-2001 fishing history on Georges Bank cod. See id. at 22,983. This
was the first "hard quota" groundfish program in New England since the
1980s. In a hard quota program, a fishery has to close once it has caught its
numerical limit of fish. Another sector, the Georges Bank Cod Fixed Gear
Sector, was created in 2006 by what the New England Council calls a
framework adjustment. NEW ENG. FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, FRAMEWORK
ADJUSTMENT 42 TO THE NORTHEAST MULTISPECIES FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN
306 (2006), available at http://www.nefmc.org/nemulti/frame/fw42/
final_fw42_sec05.pdf.
89. Fisheries of the Northweastern United States; Northeast
Multispecies Fishery, Scoping Process, 71 Fed. Reg. at 64,942.
90. Id. at 64,943. At least in New England, the Council has had to deal
with a long lead time in amendment approval, primarily because of federal
process requirements. The deadline for submitting a plan for implementation
on the first day of the fishing year, May 1st, is usually in the early fall of the
preceding year.
91. The Council developed the existing "days-at-sea" program in the
1980s after the hard quota system established by ICNAF was abandoned.
See Anderson, supra note 2. Stated simply, in this "days-at-sea" program
there were no hard catch limits but simply annual catch targets. Scientists
and managers made estimates of how many pounds of particular fish stocks
would probably be caught under different configurations of indirect controls
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management system that would define the fishing region into
geographical areas for management purposes; various hard quota
programs, ranging from individual transferable fishing quotas
(ITQs) to stewardship shares; a point system that, according to its
proponents, would function as a more adaptive quota program;
and an expansion of the pilot sector management program set up
under the Amendment 13 FMP.92 After extensive public debate
over the various options, the New England Council decided to
carry three alternatives forward for full analysis in Amendment
16: the sector management program, a hard quota "backstop" for
the current days-at-sea program, and the current system, which
was included as the "no action" alternative.93  The other
approaches were deferred until a later amendment. 94
The New England Council's well-laid plans, however, quickly
ran into the Magnuson Reauthorization Act.95 Where the Council
thought in early 2006 that it was just making mid-term
adjustments to the rebuilding programs and other fishery rules in
Amendment 16, the new legal requirements from the Magnuson
Reauthorization Act regarding annual catch limits, accountability
measures, actions by the Council's new SSC in setting the
acceptable biological catches and overfishing limits, all of which
had to be in place by May 1, 2010, for all overfished stocks at the
latest, were a train wreck for the work plans of the Council's
technical staff. To make matters worse, NMFS was not close to
completing the revisions to the National Standard 1 guidelines
and other changed National Standards that would be applicable to
on fishing effort. Such controls included limiting the number of days fished,
altering the mesh sizes in the fishing gears used to let more fish through the
nets uncaptured, closing areas with high catch rates to fishing, and the like.
It is called an "indirect control" system because the managers do not directly
regulate the pounds of fish caught each year, but rather they attempt to
indirectly regulate the amount caught by restricting the methods of the
fishermen who catch the fish.
92. FINAL AMENDMENT 16, supra note 6, at 63-65.
93. Id. at 65-66.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 56-57. Significant time and energy was also consumed by
Framework 42 to the Groundfish FMP. NEW ENG. FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL,
FRAMEWORK ADJUSTMENT 42 TO THE NORTHEAST MULTISPECIES FISHERY
MANAGEMENT PLAN 306 (2006), available at http://www.nefme.org/nemulti/
frame/fw42/final_fw42_sec01.pdf.
39
40 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:21
all the new analyses. 96 The New England Council had no choice,
however, but to move forward with one eye on Washington and
one eye on its own newly-constituted SSC, making its best guesses
as to how its regulatory world might change.
The second unexpected event came from the science side. All
nineteen of the groundfish stocks were being comprehensively
reassessed in 2008 through the third of a series of peer-review
processes known as the Groundfish Assessment Review Meeting
(GARM III), which took place over 2007 and 2008.97 GARM III
significantly changed a number of the ways the fisheries scientists
were looking at the New England fish data and the fish
themselves, 98 including new biological reference points for all of
the nineteen stocks regulated under the Multispecies Groundfish
Fishery Management Plan.99 To give just one example, GARM III
indicated that Georges Bank cod now required a fifty-five percent
reduction in existing fishing mortality.100
Finally, the Council's SSC rejected the Council's proposed
approach in Amendment 16 for calculating the scientific
uncertainty in the estimates of the allowable biological catches
(ABCs) and annual catch limits (ACLs) as being overly
complicated and inaccurate and substituted a new approach that
they felt better reflected the existing literature on scientific
uncertainty as well as NMFS's approach to scientific uncertainty.
Since the Council was now bound to follow the SSC's advice on
these matters,101 the Council's plan development team had to go
back to the drawing board, using the SSC's alternative
methodology.
The combination of these three events produced new stock
specifications and revised rebuilding plans for many of the stocks
96. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
97. Purpose of GARM-III Meetings in 2007-2008, NOAA OFF. CHIEF INFO.
OFFICER (Oct. 16, 2009), http://www.cio.noaa.gov/Policy-Programs/prplans/
ID100.Purpose of GARM-IIImeetings.pdf.
98. See Assessment of 19 Northeast Groundfish Stocks, supra note 5.
99. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
Provisions; Fisheries of the Northeastern United States; Northeast (NE)
Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 74 Fed. Feg. 69,382, 69,383 (Dec. 31,
2009) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648). The final results of GARM III were
not available until September 2008.
100. FINAL AMENDMENT 16, supra note 6, at 8.
101. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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that suggested that further major effort reductions were going to
be necessary in the fishery to recover the overfished
populations.102 It became quickly apparent to anyone following
the process that Amendment 16 was going to have to introduce
significant new and enforceable mortality cuts on a number of key
fish stocks. Under the status quo days-at-sea program, the
additional reductions in the numbers of days that fishermen could
fish to meet the new quotas would be close to catastrophic for
many, reducing some fishermen to a just handful of days to catch
groundfish. 0 3
By mid-2008, the New England Council concluded - properly
- that there was no way it could make its scheduled May 1, 2009
deadline for implementing the amendment and revised the
Amendment 16 deadline to May 1, 2010, requesting at the same
time that NMFS issue an interim management plan to cover the
2009 fishing year.104 NMFS issued the interim plan based largely
on the New England Council's recommended interim measures,
which became effective May 1, 2009.1s
The New England Council completed its portion of the
Amendment 16 journey on October 23, 2009, when NMFS
published the notice of availability of the Council's final
amendment and its associated draft environmental review for
formal public comment. 106  Amendment 16 was a sprawling,
102. Among other reasons for pessimistic rebuilding projections that came
out of the 2008 GARM III process, the scientists indicated that fishing levels
had inadvertently been set too high by Amendment 13. The actual
recruitment of many species in the 2004-08 period, that is, the number of fish
that survived earlier life stages to "recruit" into the fishery for some of the
stocks turned out to be less than one-half the estimate that the scientists had
counted on when they set the fishing limits in Amendment 13. FINAL
AMENDMENT 16, supra note 6, at 80.
103. Many of these fishermen had diversified into other fisheries than
groundfish, but still, the economic impacts of the new scientific advice were
widely considered to spell the end of portions of the fleet.
104. See Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
Provisions; Fisheries of the Northeastern United States; Northeast (NE)
Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 74 Fed. Reg. 69,382, 69,383 (Dec. 31,
2009) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648).
105. Id. The groundfish fishing year in New England runs from May 1st
to April 30th.
106. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
Provisions; Fisheries of the Northeastern United States; Northeast (NE)
Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 74 Fed. Reg. 54,773 (Oct. 23, 2009) (to
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massive re-write of groundfish management in New England by
the New England Council. Concealing the extensive and often
contentious public policy debates that emerged from 2007 to 2009,
the final Council vote in favor of the Amendment 16 FMP was 14-
1-1.107
The Amendment 16 FMP added another species, Atlantic
wolffish (Anarhichas lupus), to the groundfish complex managed
under the Northeast Multispecies FMP; developed new stock
status determination criteria, rebuilding programs, control rules
and stock specifications processes; set annual catch limits and
accountability measures; expanded the sector management
program and developed an approach for calculating each sector
member's catch history for purposes of creating a collective quota
under which each sector would operate; established new effort
controls for fishermen who did not join sectors; created new
management and accountability measures for the recreational
fishery; created new recordkeeping and reporting requirements;
and modified or initiated a number of special access programs and
other targeted programs. 08 NMFS received some 1519 comments
in response to its call for comments on the amendment.109 The
administrative record that was assembled later for the judicial
review of the Amendment 16 FMP was over 62,000 pages.110
NMFS published notice of final regulations implementing the
Amendment 16 FMP"' on April 9, 2010,112 some three weeks
be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648).
107. New England Management Council Motions, June 22-25, 2009, NEW
ENG. FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL (June 22, 2009), http://nefinc.org/
actions/motions/motions-jun09.pdf. David Goethel, a fisherman from New
Hampshire, was the lone dissenting vote. NMFS Regional Director Patricia
A. Kurkul, who would ultimately have to determine with NMFS whether the
Amendment met all its requirements, was the abstaining vote. The
proceedings of this June 2009 Council meeting, with page after page of
motions, motion amendments, perfections of motions, and withdrawal of
motions, provide a good window into the degree to which the New England
Council debated every issue raised about Amendment 16. Id.
108. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
Provisions; Fisheries of the Northeastern United States; Northeast (NE)
Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 74 Fed. Reg. at 69,383-405.
109. REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!searchResults;dct=
PS;rpp=10;po=10;s=Fisheries,+Amendment+16 (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).
110. Administrative Record, New Bedford v. Locke, No. 10-cv-10789 (D.
Mass. June 30, 2011), ECF No. 22.
111. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
2012] FEDERAL GROUNDFISH MANAGEMENT
before the start of the 2010 fishing year that would be governed by
Amendment 16 FMP. Of the entire package, only one pilot
program proposed by the New England Council was disapproved
by NMFS as being inconsistent with the national standards in the
Magnuson-Stevens Act.1 13 The new rules went into effect on May
1, 2010.114 The historical landings of the active groundfishermen
who elected to fish under the new sector provisions created by
Amendment 16 FMP were such that the new sector program
comprised ninety-eight percent of the total annual groundfish
allocation for the 2010 fishing year.115
Amendment 16 was not perfect and certainly not the last
word on groundfish management in New England. But the CLF
concluded that the Northeast Multispecies FMP as amended by
Amendment 16 was generally consistent for the first time since
1989 with both the letter and spirit of the law: a tremendous
achievement by the New England Council. Nonetheless, within a
month, three independent petitions for judicial review of the
Amendment 16 FMP were filed in various U.S. district courts.
Provisions; Fisheries of the Northeastern United States; Northeast (NE)
Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,262, 18,263 (Apr. 9,
2010) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 902, 50 C.F.R. pt. 648). Amendment 16
is actually comprised of three sets of regulations published on the same day:
the Amendment 16 regulations and Final Environmental Impact Statement,
the operations plans for the seventeen sectors that would operate in the 2010
fishing year, and a specifications document (referred to as Framework 44)
that set the catch limits for the twenty stocks for the fishing years 2010-12.
See id.
112. Id. at 18,262.
113. Id. at 18,263.
114. Id. at 18,304. Because of the time constraints and other
considerations, including the fact that the interim rule that NMFS
implemented at the Council's request as a holding place for Amendment 16
expired on April 30, 2010, NMFS exercised its authority under the
Administrative Procedures Act to waive the normal 30-day waiting period
before published rules become effective. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3) (2006);
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act Provisions;
Fisheries of the Northeastern United States; Northeast (NE) Multispecies
Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. at 18,304.
115. Andrew Kitts et al., 2010 Final Report on the Performance of the
Northeast Multispecies (Groundfish) Fishery (May 2010 - April 2011), NE.
FISHERIES SCI. CTR. 1 (August 2011), available at http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/
publications/crd/crd1119/ crd1119.10.24.2011.pdf.
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V. BACK TO COURT(S)
On April 27, 2009, James Lovgren filed a complaint on behalf
of himself and "all other similarly situated" aggrieved fishermen,
who were holders of the Northeast Multispecies federal fishing
permit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey.116
On May 9, 2010, the City of New Bedford and various other
fishermen and fishing-related interests alleged to be adversely
affected by Amendment 16 filed a complaint in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts.1 7 The New Bedford and
the Lovgren plaintiffs both sought expedited review pursuant to
16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(4). On May 7, 2010, the marine conservation
group Oceana filed a complaint with the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia.118 With the Massachusetts and New
Jersey parties' agreement, the government successfully moved to
transfer the New Jersey case to Massachusetts and consolidate
the two cases. 119  Oceana objected to consolidation and its
challenge to Amendment 16 stayed in the District of Columbia.
CLF's July 9, 2010 motion to intervene on the government's side
in the New Bedford case was granted.120
The various petitioners challenged Amendment 16 on a
variety of grounds. The New Bedford and Lovgren plaintiffs
focused on various alleged violations of the Magnuson-Stevens
Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Administrative
Procedures Act, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, and the U.S.
Constitution.121 Oceana's challenge was more narrowly focused on
116. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Lovgren v.
Locke, No. 10-cv-2162 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2010), ECF No. 1. Mr. Lovgren
apparently filed this as a substitution for an earlier filed complaint in the
same court, docketed as 3:09-02148. Id. at 2.
117. Complaint at 1, New Bedford v. Locke, 10-cv-10789 (D. Mass. May 9,
2010), ECF No. 1. This complaint was later amended to add the City of
Gloucester as a plaintiff. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint at 1-2, New
Bedford v. Locke, No. 10-cv-10789 (D. Mass. June 24, 2010) ECF No. 4.
118. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Oceana, Inc. v.
Locke, No. 10-cv-744 (D.D.C. May 7, 2010), ECF No. 1.
119. Order on Defendants' Motion to Consolidate, New Bedford v. Locke,
No. 10-cv-10789 (D. Mass. Aug. 3, 2010), ECF No. 19.
120. Motion of Conservation Law Foundation to Intervene as Defendant
at 1-2, New Bedford v. Locke, No. 10-cv-10789 (D. Mass. July 9, 1010), ECF
No. 9; Endorsed Order Entered Granting 9 Motion to Intervene pursuant to
Rule 24(b), New Bedford v. Locke, No. 10-cv-10789, (D. Mass. Sept. 7, 2010).
121. The Lougren complaint also prayed for certification as a class action
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issues related to bycatch monitoring in general and accountability
for the catch of a groundfish stock in the sea scallop fishery.122
The Lovgren and New Bedford plaintiffs both sought unusual
relief: in addition to declaratory judgment, Lovgren sought, inter
alia, an order that the Secretary of Commerce "seriously evaluate
whether negotiated rulemaking is appropriate pursuant to the
Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570a" or,
alternatively, "pursuant to the Fishery Negotiation Panel, 50
C.F.R. § 600.750 et seq."123 The New Bedford plaintiffs sought,
inter alia, declaratory relief, compensatory damages, and an order
that the defendant "conduct a full Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
which takes into account the cumulative effect of all fishery
management plans."1 24
The New Bedford plaintiffs also made it abundantly clear
from the earliest filings in the case that they intended to pursue a
and sought a jury trial, both of which were strange requests given that this
case was fundamentally a record review case under the Administrative
Procedure Act. See 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(1) (2006). The Lovgren plaintiffs
never pursued these requests.
122. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note
116, at T 1. The Oceana petition for judicial review was still pending before
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia at the time this
article was being written and will not be covered here.
123. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 116, at
18.
124. Complaint, supra note 117, at 11-12; Plaintiffs' First Amended
Complaint, supra note 117, at 15. Another group, Food & Water Watch, Inc.,
sought to intervene on October 8, 2010, on the side of the plaintiffs
challenging Amendment 16 on a variety of grounds, most of which had not
been raised by the plaintiffs' original complaints. Motion for Food & Water
Watch, Inc. To Intervene As Plaintiff, New Bedford v. Locke, No. 10-cv-10789,
(D. Mass Oct. 8, 2010), ECF No. 37. The court ultimately disallowed their
motion and permitted them to appear as amicus curiae in the proceedings.
Order at 1-2, New Bedford v. Locke, No. 10-cv-10789 (Feb. 4, 2011), ECF No.
78. Food and Water Watch filed an interlocutory appeal to the First Circuit
Court of Appeals challenging the district court's action, Locke v. Food &
Water Watch, No. 11-1303 (1st Cir. Mar. 21, 2011), but later withdrew it.
This intervention raised an important issue with respect to whether an
intervener can raise new issues challenging a fishery management plan after
the 30-day jurisdictional statute of limitations in the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
In the case of Food & Water Watch, the issues it wanted to raise were
advanced five months after the statutory limitations period for challenging
the management plan had run. While this issue was fully briefed to the First
Circuit in Food & Water Watch's appeal, it was not legally resolved because
the appeal was dismissed by mutual consent on the parties. Judgment
entered on August 30, 2011.
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far-ranging course of discovery, including deposing all the
principal decision-makers on Amendment 16, from Council
members up to the head of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, to support their suspicions that Amendment 16
was both engineered and approved by NMFS in bad faith and as a
result of improper conduct.125 The district court alluded to the
plaintiffs' discovery as a "fishing expedition" at oral argument on
the discovery motions. 126 By this tactic and seemingly against
their own stated interests, the plaintiffs managed to drag out the
Amendment 16 judicial review proceedings despite the fact that it
was strictly a record review case and despite their own insistence
for an expedited process. All their requests for depositions and
other discovery to supplement the administrative record were
summarily denied. 127
The New Bedford plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
argued that Amendment 16 violated the law in several
particulars. First, the amendment improperly managed the
multispecies fishery on a stock-by-stock basis rather than on a
whole fishery basis. Second, the allocations in the amendment
were alleged to be invalid because they were based on different
criteria for different subcomponents of the commercial fleet and
for the recreational fishery. Third, the annual catch limits were
allegedly too restrictive. Finally, they argued that Amendment
16's expanded sector program failed to follow the statutory
procedures set out for Limited Access Privilege Programs (LAPPs)
in the Magnuson-Stevens Act.128
The focus points of the summary judgment arguments by the
Lougren plaintiffs were the alleged use of a flawed database of
landings history that violated National Standard 2's requirement
to base management on "the best scientific information
125. E.g., Joint Statement and Discovery Plan at 4-8, New Bedford v.
Locke, No. 10-cv-10789 (D. Mass. Sept. 3, 2010), ECF No. 24.
126. Transcript of Oral Argument, New Bedford v. Locke, No. 10-cv-10789
(D. Mass. March 15, 2011).
127. Order, supra note 124, at 2.
128. Memorandum of the Cities of New Bedford and Gloucester and
Others In Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, New Bedford
v. Locke, No. 10-cv-10789, 2011 WL 2636863 (D. Mass Nov. 22, 2010), ECF
No. 57. The New Bedford plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment identified
several other alleged deficiencies with respect to the analysis of costs, socio-
economic effects, and bycatch. Id. at 21-29.
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available;"129 a failure to represent mid-Atlantic fishermen
adequately in the New England Council's management bodies and
the Amendment 16 process, thereby violating National Standard
4's prohibition against discrimination between states and
National Standard 6's requirement to take variations in fisheries
into account; 130 a failure to minimize bycatch as required by
National Standard 9;131 and a violation of the LAPP rules by
failing to have a referendum before implementing the sector
management system.132
Injecting an explicit political overtone into the proceedings,
the Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Deval
Patrick, and the head of the state Division of Marine Fisheries,
Paul Diodati,133 and Congressmen Barney Frank (4th District
MA) and John Tierney (6th District MA) filed separate
memoranda as amici curiae in support of the plaintiffs. Those
memoranda argued that Amendment 16 violated at least four
national standards. 134 Food & Water Watch (F&WW), a national
non-profit organization, was also granted an opportunity to file an
amicus brief in support of plaintiffs' challenge, 135 and the Georges
Bank Cod Fixed Gear Sector, a sector that had been formed under
the Amendment 13 FMP, filed an amicus brief in support of the
defendants.136
129. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2) (2006). Lovgren also argued, but did not
press, that the use of the "flawed database" also amounted to a taking under
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Lovgren Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment at 8-10, No. 10-cv-10789, 2011 WL 2636863 (D. Mass.
Nov. 22, 2010), ECF No. 55-1 (citing U.S. CoNsT. amend. V). This pleading
was styled as a motion but was in fact Lovgren's memorandum in support of
summary judgment.
130. Lovgren Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 129,
at 11-12 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(4) & (6) (2006)).
131. Id. at 13 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(9) (2006)).
132. Id. at 15-16.
133. It is paradoxical that a Governor and his chief state fisheries
management official would make an effort to block a federal fishery
management plan in court that they had in fact helped to craft as members
on the New England Council, and for which they had also voted.
134. Brief, Amici Curiae, filed by Attorney General Martha Coakley on
Behalf of Deval Patrick as the Governor of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts and Paul Diodati as the Director of the Division of Marine
Fisheries for the Commonwealth at 1-2, New Bedford v. Locke, No. 10-cv-
10789, 2011 WL 2636863 (D. Mass. Feb. 4, 2011), ECF No. 79.
135. See Order, supra note 124, at 1-2.
136. Memorandum of Amicus Curiae Georges Bank Cod Fixed Gear
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The Lougren plaintiffs and F&WW argued strenuously that
the sector management program set up by Amendment 16
constituted an individual fishing quota system and, therefore,
specifically required a referendum of the fishermen in the fishery
before it could be adopted and implemented. 137 This was perhaps
the key issue on review. If the Amendment 16 FMP violated these
provisions, virtually the entire amendment would have to be
scrapped by the New England Council, the managers would have
to revert to the old rules, and the active groundfishery that was
well into the new fishing season would be thrown into chaos. 138
This legal issue turned on a very specific question: were the
"potential sector contributions" assigned to each permit holder
that were used for calculating how much quota a sector would
have to fish on during the fishing year the same as an "individual
fishing quota" (IFQ). F&WW also argued an issue in their amicus
brief that was not raised by any of the plaintiffs: that Amendment
16 violated the National Environmental Policy Act by not
analyzing the increased damage that would occur to the marine
environment as a result of what F&WW predicted as a likely shift
Sector in Support of Defendants on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment,
New Bedford v. Locke, No. 10-cv-10789, 2011 WL 2636863 (D. Mass. Feb. 22,
2011), ECF No. 88.
137. E.g., Memorandum of Amicus Curiae Food & Water Watch, Inc. in
Support of Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment at 1, New Bedford v.
Locke, No. 10-cv-10789, 2011 WL 2636863 (D. Mass. Mar. 17, 2011), ECF No.
104 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(6)(D)(i) (2006) (prohibiting the
implementation of an individual fishing quota program without a more than
two-thirds vote of fishermen)).
138. One of the inherent challenges of judicial review under the
Magnuson-Stevens Act is the fact that such review does not typically even get
under way until the next fishing season under the challenged rules is already
open. In the case of Amendment 16, the amendment went into effect on May
1, 2010, and the challenges were not filed until the end of the first week of
May 2010, and some were attempted to be filed five months after that. See
Motion for Food and Water Watch, Inc. To Intervene As Plaintiff, supra note
124. By the time the administrative record on a complicated amendment can
be assembled, the issues briefed and argued, and a decision reached, many
months will have gone by in the best case. With Amendment 16, the district
court decision did not come down until June 30, 2011, more than a full year
after the amendment had gone into effect. New Bedford v. Locke, No. 10-cv-
10789, 2011 WL 2636863 (D. Mass. June 30, 2011). Without even
considering the economic instability and uncertainty that exists within the
fishery during the pendency of an appeal, the magnitude of the social and
economic consequences of the judicial rejection of a major amendment to the
fishery at such a late stage are difficult to calculate or imagine.
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in the groundfish fleet to more destructive gear under the auspices
of Amendment 16.139
The government and CLF argued in their cross motions for
summary judgment that all these claims were either without a
basis in law or in fact or both. On the issue of whether the
Amendment 16 sector program was an illegal LAPP or IFQ
program, both the government and CLF distinguished the sector
program from the IFQ programs identified by Congress as
needing special procedural approaches. Indeed, the
administrative record was replete with analysis, debate, and
discussion that make it clear that the New England Council did
not propose or intend to create such an IFQ program and had
deferred any consideration of such a program to a later
amendment.140  The Council took pains under guidance from
counsel for NMFS to ensure that Amendment 16 sectors did not
cross any IFQ or LAPP procedural lines.141 The defendants'
abilities to educate the court on the subtle but critical differences
between the Amendment 16 sector program and the LAPP
programs Congress was concerned with was critical to the success
or failure of this line of argument.
On the issue of whether Amendment 16 improperly set catch
limits on a stock-by-stock basis without taking into account the
impact of that approach on the optimum yield from the entire
fishery, CLF and the government were in agreement again: the
Magnuson-Stevens Act requires the fishery management council
to set limits on a stock-by-stock basis, even, or perhaps
particularly, in a multispecies fishery.142  This issue was a
139. See supra note 124 for a discussion regarding the jurisdictional
problems associated with the late raising of such issues.
140. See supra Part IV.
141. See Federal Defendants' Consolidated Memorandum in Support of
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Motions for
Summary Judgment, Docket Nos. 56, 61, and 63 at 12-22, New Bedford v.
Locke, No. 10-cv-10789, 2011 WL 2636863 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 2011), ECF No.
76; Defendant Conservation Law Foundation's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Oppposition to Plaintiffs' Motions for
Summary Judgment at 18-25, New Bedford v. Locke, No. 10-cv-10789, 2011
WL 2636863 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 2011), ECF No. 74.
142. E.g., Federal Defendants' Consolidated Memorandum in Support of
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Motions for
Summary Judgment, Docket Nos. 56, 61, and 63, supra note 141, at 22-28;
Defendant Conservation Law Foundation's Memorandum in Support of
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longstanding grievance with many fishermen in New England.
Many different stocks of fish are caught simultaneously in non-
selective fishing gears like the massive, mobile otter trawls in
wide use in the region. Since these different stocks of fish are
typically at different relative abundance levels, the setting of a
low catch limit on one species or stock with a hard quota could
shut down the fishery for all the stocks caught in that gear when
the limit for the limited stock was reached even though the hard
quotas on the more abundant stocks had not yet been caught.
Thus, the so-called "weaker" stock could constrain the fishery's
ability to fully harvest the higher catch available with the
abundant species. The plaintiffs argued this control rule violated
the Magnuson-Stevens Act's requirement to catch the optimum
yield in the whole fishery. 143 Thus, the question of whether
overfishing or optimum yield was the higher priority in the
Magnuson-Stevens Act once more rose from the dead and
presented itself for decision.'"
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions for
Summary Judgment, supra note 141, at 7-13.
143. This issue, in particular, caught the attention of the Massachusetts
politicians. See e.g., Memorandum of Amici Curiae Representatives Barney
Frank and John Tierney in Support of the Plaintiffs and Prospective
Plaintiff-Intervenor on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment at 8-13, New
Bedford v. Locke, No. 10-cv-10789, 2011 WL 2636863 (D. Mass. Mar. 1, 2011),
ECF No. 91; Brief, Amici Curiae, Filed by Attorney General Martha Coakley
on Behalf of Deval Patrick as the Governor of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts and Paul Diodati as the Director of the Division of Marine
Fisheries for the Commonwealth, supra note 134, at 11-16.
144. NMFS has a provision in the National Standard 1 guidelines, known
as the "mixed stock exception," which does not exist in the Magnuson-Stevens
Act itself. That provision, which was specifically revised and clarified after
the Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act, provides:
Exceptions to requirements to prevent overfishing. Exceptions to the
requirement to prevent overfishing could apply under certain limited
circumstances. Harvesting one stock at its optimum level may result
in overfishing of another stock when the two stocks tend to be caught
together (This can occur when the two stocks are part of the same
fishery or if one is bycatch in the other's fishery). Before a Council
may decide to allow this type of overfishing, an analysis must be
performed and the analysis must contain a justification in terms of
overall benefits, including a comparison of benefits under alternative
management measures, and an analysis of the risk of any stock or
stock complex falling below its MSST. The Council may decide to
allow this type of overfishing if the fishery is not overfished and the
analysis demonstrates that all of the following conditions are
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The New Bedford plaintiffs' challenge to the Amendment 16
allocation formula that was used by the New England Council to
calculate the "potential sector contribution" associated with each
groundfish permit14 5 was not complicated as a legal manner,146
but it was certainly a "hot" issue. All fishery allocation decisions,
that is, decisions as to who has been participating in a fishery,
over what period of time, and what they had caught for purposes
satisfied: (1) Such action will result in long-term net benefits to the
Nation; (2) Mitigating measures have been considered and it has
been demonstrated that a similar level of long term net benefits
cannot be achieved by modifying fleet behavior, gear
selection/configuration, or other technical characteristic in a manner
such that no overfishing would occur; and (3) The resulting rate of
fishing mortality will not cause any stock or stock complex to fall
below its MSST more than 50 percent of the time in the long term,
although it is recognized that persistent overfishing is expected to
cause the affected stock to fall below its Bmsy more than 50 percent
of the time in the long term.
50 C.F.R. § 600.310(m) (2010). Because virtually all of the stocks that are
limiting the catch of other abundant stocks in New England are also
overfished, this exception cannot be used to justify overfishing on those less
abundant, rebuilding stocks. For understandable but short-sighted reasons,
New England fishermen tend to hate this outcome. E.g., Laurie Schreiber,
Manage For Weakest Stock, Or For Fishery as a Whole?, FISHERMEN'S VOICE
(May 2009), http://www.fishermensvoice.com/ 0509manageforweakeststock
orfisheryaswhole.html.
145. Under Amendment 16, a "potential sector contribution" (PSC) was
calculated for each permit owned by a fisherman who elected to enter into a
sector contract. 50 C.F.R. § 648.87(b)(1)(i)(E) (2010). The sector totaled up
these PSCs to arrive at a total quota, called an "annual catch entitlement,"
for each regulated stock of groundfish that the sector as a whole could catch
during the fishing season. 50 C.F.R. § 648.87(b)(1)(i)(A) (2010). How the
sector then distributed this quota among its members was a decision each
sector made privately. By the terms of Amendment 16, the Council's
allocation formula used to come up with the PSCs was not permanent and
was subject to modification by the New England Council. See, e.g.,
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Provisions;
Fisheries of the Northeastern United States; Northeast (NE) Multispecies
Fishery; Amendment 16; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,262, 18,291 (Apr. 9,
2010) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 902; 50 C.F.R. pt. 648); accord FINAL
AMENDMENT 16, supra note 6, at 104 ("regardless which method is used to
determine permit history in this management action, the Council may choose a
different method for calculating permit history in the future").
146. This issue would be addressed under an abuse of discretion
standard, and the administrative record was replete with discussion,
alternative analysis, and social and economic impact analysis on this precise
topic. There was little risk that a reviewing court would reverse on this
issue.
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of allocating access to the fish in the future in a limited entry
fishery, are highly contentious and inevitably produce winners
and losers. The Council had settled on an allocation formula that
used the average landings by multispecies permit by stock during
the period of 1996-2006, although other options were also debated.
After full briefing and oral argument, Judge Zobel took the
matter under advisement. She released her decision on
Amendment 16 on June 30, 2011, thirteen months after
Amendment 16 had already gone into effect.147 Characterizing the
plaintiffs' approach to the Amendment 16 challenges as "cast[ing]
a dragnet ... , woven from a multitude of alleged failings of
[Amendment] 16," 148 the court ruled against the plaintiffs on all
counts. 149
Before tackling the LAPP/IFQ issue, the court analyzed the
standard of deference that was due to the government in its
interpretations of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. Although the New
Bedford plaintiffs insisted that little deference was due to the
agency, characterizing the agency's interpretation of the optimum
yield language as "absurd" and "prevent[ing] the statute from
achieving its stated goal," 50 the court disagreed, holding that
"Congress expressly delegated to the Secretary the authority to
create [fishery management plans]"' 51 and that Amendment 16
was developed in accordance with a "highly formalized
administrative procedure, including a notice-and-comment
147. See New Bedford v. Locke, No. 10-cv-10789, 2011 WL 2636863 (D.
Mass. June 30, 2011).
148. Id. at 1.
149. Id. at 19.
150. Memorandum of the Cities of New Bedford and Gloucester and
Others in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 128,
at 12; see also Opposition and Reply Memorandum of the Cities of New
Bedford and Gloucester and Others on Cross-Motions for Summary
Judgment at 5-6, New Bedford v. Locke, No. 10-cv-10789, 2011 WL 2636863
(D. Mass. Feb. 14, 2011), ECF No. 84 (arguing that the agency was "illogically
re-writ[ing] the Act to achieve an absurd result"). The New Bedford plaintiffs
were clearly motivated throughout their challenge by their unsubstantiated
claims that Amendment 16 was the product of a result-driven, biased agency
acting in bad faith throughout the process. See, e.g., Plaintiffs [sic]
Memorandum in Support of Their First Motion for Discovery and Completion
or Supplementation of the Administrative Record at 14-16, New Bedford v.
Locke, No. 10-cv-10789 (D. Mass. Oct. 13, 2010), ECF No. 40.
151. New Bedford, 2011 WL 2636863 at *3.
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period."152 Accordingly, the court held that full deference was
appropriate under the controlling Chevron standard.15 3
Although the court stated that it was a "close call" whether
the sector program was a LAPP or an IFQ program,154 the court's
reasoning leads one to think that the question was actually
anything but close: "the court is bound by the Agency's informed
conclusion, reached at Congress' express direction after an
extended and formal administrative process including a notice-
and-comment period."'55 Similarly, the court expressed that it
was bound by Chevron to defer to the government's interpretation
of a provision in the LAPP provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens
Act that created an exemption for sectors from the referendum
requirement. 156
Even without any deference, moreover, it is clear that the
potential sector contributions (PSCs) are dramatically different
from the IFQs that are distributed to fishermen in an IFQ
fisheries. Moreover, "sectors" in New England are exempted from
the referendum requirements even if they are construed to be a
LAPP: "[in this subparagraph [relating to referendum
requirements for IFQ programs], the term 'individual fishing
quota' does not include a sector allocation."l 57 A PSC is a sector
allocation; it can only be used by a sector.15 8 Even under a "plain
meaning" approach to statutory construction, there is no question
that Congress was exempting the groundfish sectors in New
England from the IFQ referendum requirements.
The court ruled against the plaintiffs on the issue of optimum
yield in a multispecies fishery as well. The court rejected
plaintiffs' argument that National Standard 1's requirement of
"achieving. . . the optimum yield from each fishery" meant that
multispecies stocks in a fishery had to be treated as one unit, even
if that meant ignoing the health of an individual stock component
152. Id.
153. See id. (citing United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001)
(reaffirming the widely used standard of deference developed in Chevron,
U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984))).
154. Id. at *4.
155. Id.
156. Id. The statutory exemption for sectors is set forth at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1853a(c)(6)(D)(vi) (2006).
157. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(6)(D)(vi) (2006)
158. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 648.87(b)(1)(i)(A) & (E).
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within that fishery.159 Chiding the plaintiffs for putting all the
weight of their argument on their singular interpretation of one
word, "fishery,"l 60 the court concluded that the full text of the
statute removed any ambiguity: "the rest of the [Magnuson-
Stevens Act] makes clear that the Agency must manage the health
of individual stocks," citing numerous references in the statute to
stocks in overfishing situations. 161 The court also noted the fact
that the Agency's interpretation was "longstanding and codified in
regulation," once again bringing the question squarely within
Chevron 62 and thus beyond plaintiffs' reach.163
As to the other claims, the court variously held against the
plaintiffs on the basis that the plaintiffs' claims were not
159. New Bedford, 2011 WL 2636863, at *5-6 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
160. Id. at *5. The definition of "fishery" itself is not conclusive as an
interpretive guide since it refers in pertinent part to "[o]ne or more stocks of
fish." 16 U.S.C. § 1802(13) (2006).
161. New Bedford, 2011 WL 2636863, at *5.
162. Id. at *6.
163. One can only hope that this holding ends the decadal-long contention
in New England that overfishing should be allowed in a multispecies stock
complex in order to get optimal yield from the most abundant species. At
least until the Magnuson-Stevens Act is revised to provide otherwise,
fisheries have to be managed on a stock-by-stock basis, even if they are
harvested as a complex. This is not the end of the issue however. Improved
gear technology can often take advantage of relative differences in behaviors
between species, such as the tendency of cod fish to swim to the bottom when
approached by a mobile fishing net and haddock to rise. By making rigging
nets so these cod can escape, fishermen can increase their harvest of haddock
without affecting the expeditious rebuilding of cod populations. See e.g.,
Brandie Jefferson, Net Catches One Species, Spares Others - For URI
Fisheries Team, the Ones That Got Away Help Land it a Big Catch,
PROVIDENCE J., Nov. 16, 2007, at B, available at http://www.projo.com/
news/content/fishing-net_11-16-07 AE7SURN_v13.2620a50.html. Similar
innovations have already been tried with other species, including flounder.
See e.g., DAVID CHOSID ET AL., NOAA/NMFS SALTONSTALL-KENNEDY PROGRAM
COMPLETION REPORT: FURTHER TESTING OF COD-AVOIDING TRAWL NET DESIGNS
14 (2008), available at http://www.mass.gov/dfwele/dmf/programsand
projects/conseng/skoffshorefinal.pdf. Funding for this research and
development could come from the fishing industry as well as the federal
government. Also yet to be tested is the capacity of sector managers to
communicate with their boats at sea to learn what they are catching and
directing their boats away from areas with high levels of catch of an
unwanted stock. Sectors should also provide incentives for members to
cooperate on gear or fishing improvements that reduce catch of cod or other
rebuilding populations. Keeping the stock-by-stock management strategy
provides the proper incentives for fishermen to do just that.
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supported by the record,1 64 that the Agency's resolution of the
issue was rational,165 that the disputed technical issue was clearly
within the agency's scientific expertise,166 and that the plaintiffs
were making substantive claims with respect to statutes that had
only procedural obligations, which had been fulfilled. 167 The court
declared the Lovgren plaintiffs' "convoluted" Fifth Amendment
claim "groundless."l68 The court entered judgment in the case for
the defendants on July 1, 2011.169 Both the Lougren plaintiffs and
the New Bedford plaintiffs have filed appeals of the district court
decision with the First Circuit Court of Appeals, 170 which will
probably not be decided until early 2012, almost two years after
Amendment 16 took effect.
VI. LESSONS LEARNED AND SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT THE PATH
FORWARD
CLF believes that Amendment 16 was an important and well-
articulated shift in management direction for groundfishing in
New England. After three major legislative efforts, at least four
164. New Bedford, 2011 WL 2636863, at *6 (reasonable alternatives in
fishery impact statements in the record), *8 (database claim not based on
record; claim of lack of mid-Atlantic regional representation not accurate).
165. Id. at *7-8 (PSC allocations and recreational harvest allocations;
bycatch and discards).
166. Id. at *5 (concerning alleged overly restrictive annual catch limits).
167. Id. at *8-9 (NEPA claims invalid; regulatory Flexibility Act and
Paperwork Reduction Act claims invalid).
168. Id. at *10.
169. Judgment, New Bedford v. Locke, 10-cv-10789, 2011 WL 2636863 (D.
Mass. July 1, 2011), ECF No. 114.
170. For reasons that are not clear, the plaintiffs reconfigured themselves
on appeal and filed four separate appeals with the U.S. First Circuit Court of
Appeals. James Lovgren filed an appeal on behalf of himself, other fishermen
and fishing organizations, and others against Secretary of Commerce Gary
Locke, various federal officials, Conservation Law Foundation, the Atlantic
States Marine Fisheries Commission, and the Atlantic Coastal Cooperative
Statistics Program. Lovgren v. Locke, No. 11-1964 (1st Cir. Aug. 19, 2011).
The Cities of New Bedford and Gloucester filed a second appeal against the
same parties. New Bedford v. Locke, No. 11-1952 (1st Cir. Aug. 30, 2011).
The New Hampshire Commercial Fisherman's Association and others filed a
third appeal against the same parties. Lovgren v. Locke, No. 11-1987 (1st
Cir. Aug. 26, 2011). Tempest Fisheries, Limited and others filed a fourth
appeal against the same parties. No. 11-2001 (Aug. 30, 2011). All the
appeals were based on slightly different challenges to the district court
decision and have been consolidated as City of New Bedford v. Locke, No. 11-
1952 (1st Cir. Nov. 15, 2011).
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major judicial challenges to the implementation of the Magnuson-
Stevens Act by conservation groups, and twelve amendments to
the Groundfish FMP since CLF challenged Amendment 4 in 1991,
it may be worth reflecting on that arc of fishing history in New
England and offering some thoughts about the challenges ahead.
A. Amendment 16 is a major success for the New England
Fishery Management Council.
Garret Hardin once noted that the prescription for successful
management of the public commons was "mutual coercion,
mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected."
Amendment 16 certainly fills that prescription. Even though
there were significant time pressures on the Council to get
Amendment 16 in place by May 1, 2010,172 the Council got the job
done, and their efforts have so far withstood judicial review
unscathed. The new sectors that formed under Amendment 16
were operating, in some ways, under even more pressure than the
Council was at the start of the 2010 fishing year: trying to
organize themselves, absorbing the new regulations in
Amendment 16, getting the monitoring and data management
systems in place that are critical to their success, and getting used
to cooperating rather than competing. It was a monumental task
that few outside the fishery or Council can properly appreciate.
But it happened and most fishermen were able to cast off their
lines in time to fish under the new system on May 1, 2010.
The impacts of Amendment 16 on the water and to the
pocketbooks well-being of New England's groundfishermen can be
only partially assessed at this time. The biological, economic, and
social statistics have been analyzed by NMFS in a report released
in October 2011.173 These results need to be appreciated in the
context of the Amendment 16 economic analysis, where the
Council anticipated that the short-term economic costs could be
significant, on the order of a fifteen million dollar or fifteen
percent decline in groundfish revenues.174  The Council's
estimates were based on the fishery continuing to operate
171. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243,
1247-48 (1968).
172. See supra Part IV.
173. See Kitts et al., supra note 115.
174. FINAL AMENDMENT 16, supra note 6, at 15.
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exclusively under the old management regime without the sectors
as the Council at that time had no idea how many fishermen
would elect to go into sectors by the start of the May 1, 2010
fishing year.
Fortunately, the projections were wrong. As the year-end
NOAA report summarized: "[flor the fishery as a whole in 2010,
more nominal value was obtained from fewer fish landed and less
fishing effort expended as compared to the previous three
years." 175  Year-end analyses indicate that the New England
groundfish fleet landed 12.1 million fewer pounds of groundfish
than it had in the 2009 fishing year and 11.5 million pounds fewer
of non-groundfish species.176 Gross groundfish revenues for the
fleet, however, were only down $1.8 million compared to the gross
revenues in 2009 and total revenues including all species landed
by groundfish boats in 2010 increased $26.6 million over the 2009
fishing year. 177  This increase occurred notwithstanding the
significant cutback in stock quota allocations for the year, the
chaos of the start-up of the new management system, and the
significant increase in diesel fuel prices, which were in the thirty
percent range. Notably, the groundfish fleet caught these fish
with fifteen percent fewer trips that were made in 2009, a
dramatic increase in efficiency and reduction in a vessel's variable
costs. 178 Nonetheless, although the data quality on social and
economic impacts at the "boat level" rather than the "state level"
is very poor, there seems little question that the 2010 fishing year
was far more successful for some fishermen than others,179 and
that crew positions and crew share of the profits were particularly
hard hit during the fishing year as boat owners took advantage of
their new opportunity to operate their business more efficiently.tso
175. Kitts et al., supra note 115, at 31.
176. Id. at 33.
177. Id. These gross revenues exclude all the new sector costs borne by
the sector members, field, insurance, crew costs, ice, gear, food, and all the
other variable fishing costs that have to be subtracted off the top.
178. Id. at 40.
179. New Hampshire's groundfish operations owners lost roughly $1
million in net profits, while most other states increased, in some cases like
Massachusetts' groundfish boat owners by $3.1 million in net profits. Id. at
51.
180. Crew positions in the fleet dropped by 165 and the number of crew
days at sea dropped by 17,364. Id. at 68.
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From a conservation perspective, it looks like two stocks were
overfished during the 2010 fishing year; the first time that has
probably happened, if at all, since the United States declared the
200-mile EEZ.' 8 In fact, the groundfish fleet had the opposite
problem: a lot of fish that could have been caught were not
caught. As a percentage of the total allowable catch available to
the fleet, the numbers ranged from catching only 19.9% of the
available quota for Georges Bank haddock to a 237.3% catch rate
for southern windowpane flounder.182  Eleven of the eighteen
stocks that were not overfished were in the sixty to eighty five
percent of quota-caught range.183  From the perspective of our
Atlantic cod, this looks like a great outcome1 84 but from the
perspective of the health of the groundfish fleet, the needs of
seafood consumers, and the tolerance of the region's politicians,185
this "lost harvest" of uncaught quota is a major problem that the
New England Council will have to address.
B. The Amendment 16 FMP is not perfect and some of the most
challenging social and economic management decisions still lay
ahead.
There were some less anticipated results associated with the
implementation of the Amendment 16 FMP, mostly on the social
and economic front. 186 Two aspects of the Council's Amendment
181. Northeast Multispecies Fishery Final Year-End Results for Fishing
Year 2010, NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. at Table 5 (Oct. 3, 2011),
available at http://www.nefmc.org/nemulti/cte-mtgdocs/111005/MultsYE10
jDetail.pdf.
182. Id. The southern windowpane flounder quota overages were a
relatively small amount of fish in terms of tonnage and were not landed as
there was a zero possession limit. All the same, this stock is in terrible shape
and the scientists were hoping to get the catch to as close to zero as possible.
183. Id.
184. These landings also have to be understood as landings, not catch.
Estimates are not available yet on what the discard rates were at sea,
although anecdotally, representatives of the sector system have claimed that
discards are significantly down under the sector program. The landings
"shortfall" must also be offset by the fact that the New England Council is
fairly risk prone in its stock assessments: many of the stocks are only 50%
likely to meet their rebuilding objectives. See FINAL AMENDMENT 16, supra
note 6, at 488.
185. See supra note 143.
186. It is perhaps more accurate to state that the potential for these
results was significantly discounted by a number of Council members,
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16 allocation formula remain troubling to many fishermen and
conservationists, both from a political and an equitable
perspective. As a reminder, for vast majority of the groundfish
fleet the Amendment 16 allocation formula used fishing history
during the period of 1996-2006 as the basis for the allocation.
New England's groundfish fishery is exclusively a small
business fishery, although it is not homogeneous. Different
businesses have different business plans and approaches to the
fishery. There is a notable difference between fishermen who
operate "day boats" that return to shore every day and those who
operate "trip boats" that stay at sea for a week or more. The
allocation formula produced two problems in the real world for
these differently scaled operations. The first was that for many
coastal "day boat" fishermen, the 2007-2009 fishing years had
been the first strong years for groundfish catch in more than a
decade. I believe that this was probably a result of the rebuilding
of inshore fish stocks, which could now be found closer to the small
coastal ports and their fishermen during this period.187  For a
number of fishermen, particularly in Massachusetts and New
Hampshire, the Council's allocation formula did not come close to
reflecting what they had been catching recently.'" While the
although the issues were raised repeatedly by Council member David
Goethel. The Council did estimate significant potential short-term economic
costs associated with Amendment 16, but did not focus this analysis on
distributional inequities, primarily because of lack of real time data. See
infra text accompanying notes 189-200.
187. It bears remembering that in the 1994-1996 period, coastal and off-
shore populations of some fish like cod and haddock were driven down to
their lowest levels in the database record, which spans many decades. Once-
abundant coastal populations of fish that the local small boat fishermen once
easily reached without making an overnight trip were gone.
188. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts attempted to quantify these
losses and did an intensive analysis of the impacts of Amendment 16 on a
group of fishermen located on the south shore of Massachusetts, known as
Sector 10. The twenty-seven boats in this sector lost $647,000 (fifty-two
percent) in net groundfish revenues under the new system and with their
landings of other species of fish is factored in, lost $404,800 in net revenues.
Six crew positions were lost (twenty-two percent decline) and crew pay
declined by $242,500. See David Pierce et al., MAss. Div. OF MARINE
FISHERIES, Comparative Economic Survey and Analysis of Northeast Fishery
Sector 10 (South Shore, Massachusetts) at 4-5 (November 2011) available at
http://www.mass.gov/dfwele/dmf/marinefisheriesnotices/2011/groundfish-req
uest and reports_111511.pdf (this report was included as an attachment as
an attachment to Governor Deval Patrick's Letter to Commerce Secretary
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allocation cutoff date was likely more related to the availability of
recent fishing year data to the Amendment 16 analysts than any
intention by the Council to freeze these fishermen out, the fact
remains that their catch history between the 2007-2009 was well
below their allocation for the 2010 fishing year.
Second, in 1996, when inshore stocks had crashed and
aggressive management measures were put into place to rebuild
them, many day boat fishermen were forced to abandon their
existing groundfish operations and pursued other species, even
though they were likely a relatively small factor in the crash. A
number of these fishermen also stopped fishing heavily for
groundfish in what they rightly perceived as an exercise of
stewardship in order to give the fish an opportunity to rebuild.
The result was that this cohort of fishermen had no groundfish
landings during the 1996-2006 qualifying period to bring forward
into the allocation formula for the sector management system.
The situation during this same period was generally different
for the larger, more mobile overnight "trip" groundfish boats that
had the boat size and horsepower to readily move around to where
fish were aggregating over a wide range of ocean; many of these
boats actually concentrated almost exclusively on continuing to
catch groundfish during this qualifying period. As a result, this
group had significant catch histories that then became valuable in
the Amendment 16 sector system. The fishermen who did not
have history during that 1996-2006 period understandably felt
that they had been unceremoniously cut out of a fishery in which
they had always been active, whether historically or during the
2007-2009 period. For this group, there were significant equity
issues that had gone unaddressed in the Amendment 16 FMP.
The potential for disenfranchisement of a number of coastal
fishermen, mostly smaller day-boat operations,189 from the new
Bryson dated November 15, 2011).
189. A day-boat operation is one that usually fishes for part of a day and
rarely stays out at sea overnight. These operations tend to be comprised of
the smaller and older vessels and the fishermen who are less driven to
become "highliners" in the industry. They are the predominant fleet in many
of the smaller fishing ports like, for example, Chatham or Plymouth,
Massachusetts or Rye, New Hampshire. By contrast, a "trip boat" operation
is designed to fish at sea for an extended period of time, sometimes weeks.
These tend to be the bigger, better capitalized, "highliner" operations that
come from one of the larger ports, such as New Bedford and Gloucester in
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Amendment 16 fishery could not be fully analyzed at the time the
Council was pulling together Amendment 16. This is particularly
true with respect to the potential impacts on those operations that
had high landings of groundfish in the 2007-2009 period, which
data was not available for analysis when the finishing touches of
Amendment 16 were happening.
Another impact that appears to be significant during the 2010
fishing year that was not able to be fully analyzed in the
Amendment 16 FMP was the loss of crew positions. This
phenomenon appears to have been particularly significant in the
larger ports but occurred in all sizes of boats.1 90 It is likely a
function of both the significantly decreased number of trips boat
owners needed to take in the 2010 fishing year to catch their
quota as well as the new ability of boat owners operating within
sectors to consolidate their groundfish permits from multiple boats
that they owned and operated onto one or two boats, thereby
eliminating crew positions. This loss of crew jobs illustrates the
inherent tensions that are present in trying to implement the
national standards: National Standard 5 emphasizes
consideration of efficiency measures which tend to focus on the
boat owner benefits while National Standard 8 focuses on
minimizing social and economic impacts on fishing communities,
which clearly includes the crew impacts.191
The New England Council seems to recognize that it has not
focused adequately on the complex task of analyzing or managing
social or economic impacts of their fishery management plans,
even though that task is always one of the major objectives of any
management plan. The questions are challenging indeed. How
does the plan balance its goal of achieving "economic efficiency" in
the fishery against its goals of "encourag[ing] diversity within the
fishery" and providing "reasonable ... access to the groundfish
species?"' 92  How can managers collect the data or access the
social and economic expertise to allow them to accomplish the
Massachusetts and Portland in Maine. Their operations also tend to be
targeted more directly at a smaller number of fish stocks than are the day
boat operations, which tend to be more opportunistic.
190. See Kitts et al., supra note 115, at 51.
191. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(5) (2006), with 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(8)
(2006).
192. FINAL AMENDMENT 16, supra note 6, at 67.
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Council's seventh objective for groundfish management: "[t]o the
extent possible, maintain a diverse groundfish fishery, including
different gear types, vessel sizes, geographic locations, and levels
of participation[?]"' 93 How can the Council Members who have
direct, personal economic interests in particular gears, locations,
and vessel sizes put aside their biases and interests sufficiently to
advance the personal interests of others, many of whom are direct
competitors?194 How are the state fishery directors, who sit at the
Council table for the specific, but not exclusive, purpose of
speaking for the interests of the diverse fishing interests and ports
in their jurisdictions to take positions if they do not each have a
state strategic plan that has been publicly and transparently
developed to guide their actions?' 95 What precisely does National
Standard 8's goal of protecting fishing communities,196 which is
193. Id.
194. The New England Council actually represents a fairly good cross-
section of the fishing industry from small commercial draggers and
recreational charter boat operations to some of the largest vessels and
operations in the region. Based just on personal observation, however, it
appears that the larger trip-boat operations are much better organized and
effective in advancing their agendas through the council process.
195. For example, Massachusetts has a strategic plan that is beautifully
rendered but has little, if anything, that would guide the Director's votes on
the Council with respect to fleet diversity. See MASS. Div. OF MARINE
FISHERIES, STRATEGIC PLAN 2010-2014 at 21, http://www.mass.gov/dfwele/
dmf/publications/dmf strategicplan.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). The only
statement in the plan on this topic is one of the goals: "[wiork to minimize
socio-economic impacts on the Commonwealth's fishing industry and coastal
fishing communities resulting from limitations imposed by interstate and
federal fisheries management plans." Id. What does this goal mean
specifically to the Commonwealth's interest in preserving for example,
fishermen in the port of Marshfield, Massachusetts?
196. National Standard 8 directs managers to "provide for the sustained
participation of such [fishing] communities" and "to the extent practicable,
minimize adverse economic impacts on such communities." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1851(a)(8) (2006). The National Standard 8 guidelines are no help at all on
these sorts of questions, and, in fact, seem a bit hostile to the discussion:
"[this standard does not constitute a basis for allocating resources to a
specific fishing community nor for providing preferential treatment based on
residence in a fishing community." 50 C.F.R. § 600.345(b)(2) (2010). And
there is no reconciliation of whatever National Standard 8 might mean in
light of the National Standard 5 guidelines relating to efficiency in fisheries,
which has the following language: "this standard highlights one way that a
fishery can contribute to the Nation's benefit with the least cost to society:
Given a set of objectives for the fishery, an FMP should contain management
measures that result in as efficient a fishery as is practicable or desirable."
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intended to stimulate this sort of debate on fishery management
councils, mean in practice?
In fact, it is ridiculously easy to make up questions that
neither the law nor the National Standard guidelines help the
fishery management councils answer. Moreover, the public and
the Council are crippled by the fact that the Magnuson-Stevens
Act makes a great deal of the most important data on who is
catching how much fish out of the public eye, shielding it with
confidentiality protection.197 Clearly, there are no a priori "right"
answers to any of these social or economic questions, but without
any data, can there really be any answers? To its credit, the New
England Council is tackling these questions now through a new
amendment to the Groundfish FMP.198  Again, from a process
perspective, the answers to these questions bring Garret Hardin
back to mind with his "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by
the majority of the people affected." 99
Moreover, there is still the open policy question of how the
"new" fish that become available to be caught as a result of the
rebuilding stock populations should get allocated. Existing
groundfishermen with high Amendment 16 allocations, who have
been in the fishery for decades and have made investment
decisions based on that history, will no doubt claim that in the
future as the stocks rebuild, they should continue to be allocated
the same percentage of the stocks for which they have a history,
regardless of how large the future rebuilt population is. This
approach would amount to granting a permanent stake in a
significant public fishery to a limited group of individuals. As
noted above,200 from the standpoint of many fishermen, many of
these groundfish operations that would be advantaged by such an
approach are the same ones who primarily drove the groundfish
populations down to those historic lows in the 1990s and
continued to harvest groundfish heavily as stocks were being
50 C.F.R. § 600.330(b) (2010). That language is not very reassuring to small
fishing operators or small ports.
197. See 16 U.S.C. § 1881b (2006).
198. See COUNCIL REPORT, NEw ENG. FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL 3 (July
2011), available at http://www.nefmc.org/actions/council-reports/council-
report-jun11.pdf (Council to work on accumulation limits and fleet diversity).
199. See Hardin, supra note 171.
200. See supra Part VI.B.
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rebuilt in the early 2000s. It is appropriate to question whether
this group should be further rewarded for this single-minded focus
on the region's groundfish, particularly at the expense of
fishermen who could not reach the fish because they owned
smaller or older boats or who abstained from groundfishing during
rebuilding?
Additionally, should not some portion of these rebuilding
populations be set aside for new entrants to the fishery, young
men or women who want to make a living from the sea in a
traditional way, and what about the potential for providing some
level of groundfish access to the crew members who lost their
positions because of cost-efficiency improvements introduced by
the Amendment 16 FMP? If this is a done-deal regarding future
allocations where the only consideration that matters is what one
was fishing for between 1996 and 2006, then the result is that the
only way those potential new groundfishermen can gain entry is
by buying their way in and mortgaging their future from day one.
The New England Council should have a problem with that
outcome. This is a public resource, after all, and the current
winners made few, if any, investments in the resource, beyond
their own boats and gear, and in many cases fought against the
rebuilding provisions at the time. Indeed, they received an
enormous windfall through the Amendment 16 process. Under
the terms in the Amendment 16 FMP, the PSC that a permit
holder was allocated that the fisherman's sector could now count
as a hard quota continues to grow as the fish populations rebound.
That seems wrong. Is it not a more equitable and
proportionate management response to allocate a portion of the
rebuilt stocks to new entrants or historic participants without
cost, just as the fish were made available to the current set of
winners? The new, higher populations of groundfish are as good a
place to look for fish to support such a "newcomer" allocation as
any. Ultimately, the New England Council will decide these
matters. But the Council does have a number of options and
significant power as well as discretion. One would hope that, if no
one else, the state fisheries directors who sit on the Council would
recognize the value and benefits of preserving both past and
future heritages in fishing and act to design programs to facilitate
that process.
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C. Prevailing on judicial review of a well-done fishery
management plan is very difficult.
There is a popular notion that litigation, rather than fishery
management councils, controls fisheries management. The
litigation associated with the Amendment 16 FMP belies that
notion. CLF had the unusual opportunity to intervene on the side
of the government in defense of the Amendment 16 FMP and to
get the benefit of all the arguments that the government usually
puts up against CLF when it challenges fishery management
plans as a plaintiff; it was quite an eye-opener. Between Chevron
deference to agency interpretations of "delegated" legislating2ol
and Baltimore Gas202 deference to the scientific, economic and
even social expertise of the regulating agency, the practical reality
is that with a well-done plan and with a legitimate and
transparent plan development public process, there is not much
"judicial review" room left for a would-be challenger, as the
plaintiffs in the Amendment 16 FMP litigation found out at the
district court level. Moreover, the regulating agency itself is
somewhat constrained by the structure of the Magnuson-Stevens
Act, which gives the fishery management councils front-line
authority over and responsibility for the development of the
management plans that regulate most of the Nation's federal
fisheries. That would suggest that when this fishery management
system is working at its best, all of the action would be at the
fishery management council level.
One of the lessons from the Amendment 16 experience,
therefore, is that a fishery management council can significantly
advance the probability of success of its management plans with
NMFS and reduce the vulnerability of its plans to judicial reversal
by exercising due diligence and care in the planning and execution
of its management planning process. Questions of law will still be
fair game, particularly in the early years after a major legislative
change and before many courts have considered and ruled on the
questions, but that is the nature of our jurisprudential system, not
something the councils can control. On the other hand, council or
NMFS strategies that try to tuck issues "under the rug" or finesse
201. See e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31 (2001).
202. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87,
103 (1983).
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them by procedural gimmicks and policy choices that are not
clearly identified, debated, and subjected to full public review
practically invite litigation. The Magnuson-Stevens Act has both
substantive and procedural objectives; both must be honored by
the fishery management council and NMFS.
D. The emerging science of fish and fisheries management will
continue to challenge managers, fishermen, and the public alike.
The nature of science is change. Since "[sIcience is a
particular way of understanding the natural world,"203 as our way
of understanding that natural world changes, so does our science.
With the oceans, we actually understand very little. As a result,
we have to use simulations to make decisions. Fisheries
population models are tools to help us estimate fish abundance
and stock structure and to simulate the consequences of various
management approaches. "It is important to always remember
that models are human constructions constrained by human
understanding and computing power and as such remain theories
to be confronted to the perceptions of stakeholders (in
participatory modeling) and tested and progressively improved
through adaptive approaches."204
Fishermen, managers, and conservationists are wise to
remember this reality and be able to adapt their approaches to the
changing science of fisheries and fisheries management modeling
by being particularly precautionary in the setting of catch levels.
The closer a fish population is to a maximum sustainable yield
level, the fewer the social and economic impacts if the stock size
estimates change. The Amendment 16 FMP was a good case in
point, where the scientific advice changed dramatically mid-
stream.205 Was the former science bad? No, it was the best that
was available at the time, and the New England Council and the
Northeast Fisheries Science Center in NMFS went to lengths to
validate the modeling predictions and assumptions through peer
review. That peer review changed prior assumptions about a
203. Nature of Science, U. CAL. MUSEUM PALEONTOLOGY, http://evolution.
berkeley.edu/evosite/nature/index.shtml (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
204. Serge M. Garcia, Modelling Fisheries, FAO FISHERIES AND
AQUACULTURE DEPARTMENT (May 27, 2005), http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/
14754/en.
205. See supra Part IV.
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number of the fish species based on new data and understandings;
those changes are ultimately for the better.206  Even after the
careful stock assessments in 2008, recent new assessments
indicate that the 2007 modeling results for Gulf of Maine cod were
much too optimistic and had allowed significant overfishing
resulting in the stock being determined to be overfished once
again in 2011 despite the best efforts of the scientists, the
managers, and the fishermen alike.207
Is the current science right? Probably in the sense that it is
the best science available208 but not in the sense that it is
immutable. The best available science that exists to "look" at
groundfish populations beneath the surface of the ocean and
support the management effort to produce healthy, sustainable
fish populations and thriving fishing communities will forever be
changing as the scientific understanding of the factors affecting
those populations changes. If the experience in New England is
any indicator, fisheries science is not rocket science, it is much
harder than rocket science at least in terms of producing precise
predictions. This fact makes the New England Council's
rebuilding strategy, which has a high risk of failure, particularly
problematic and emphasizes the strategic importance of
rebuilding all stocks to their maximum yield levels as quickly as
possible.
Moreover, groundfish abundance and the presence or absence
of species in a geographical region is controlled by many more
factors than just fishing mortality. Fish are profoundly subject to
a number of natural variables-currents, temperatures, salinity,
movements of both predator and prey subcomponents in their food
web, to name some of the more important, that are constantly
changing themselves. With accelerated ocean temperature
changes, increased freshwater glacial melt entering the oceans,
and ocean acidification processes, all of which are associated with
the human emission of greenhouse gases from carbon-based fuel
sources, the external variables acting on fish in New England in
206. See e.g., FINAL AMENDMENT 16, supra note 6, at 274-75.
207. See e.g., Panel Backs Up Dismal Cod Assessment, Bos. GLOBE (Dec. 2,
2011), http://www.boston.com/news/local/rhodeislancl/articles/2011/12/02/
panelbacksupdismal cod_assessment_1322854110/.
208. See New Bedford v. Locke, No. 10-cv-10789, 2011 WL 2636863, at *7
(D. Mass. June 30, 2011).
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the future may have a far more significant impact on New
England's fish populations than the removal rates from the
fisheries. Fisheries scientists and managers will have to adjust
fishing removal rates in the management plans to recognize those
shifting populations even with perfect compliance by fishermen
out on the water operating under the best fishery management
plan.
Current fisheries models being actively used to manage
groundfish in New England do not explicitly account for those
external factors. Recognizing this, both government and non-
government scientists have been focused on developing ecosystem-
based fisheries and non-fisheries models for some time, models
that could integrate all the main environment drivers on fish
dynamics and production in the region. Perhaps not surprisingly,
there still is no firm agreement about what these models should
look like and what they can measure or predict and this lack of
agreement has persisted for some time.209 The importance of the
objectives, however, cannot be overstated: "[w]hen fishery
managers understand the complex ecological and socioeconomic
environments in which fish and fisheries exist, they may be able
to anticipate the effects that fishery management will have on the
ecosystem and the effects that ecosystem change will have on
fisheries."210
The most significant challenge may well be designing the
process by which a transition from one scientific paradigm about
fish and fisheries to another, more complex paradigm will occur.
If the fishery management focus, for example, shifts from a single
stock assessment approach to a multi-stock assessment focused on
total biomass at various trophic levels, that is, modeling and
assessing all the species that are at the same functional level in
an ecosystem and eat the same food sources for their energy
without regard to their speciation, how will that shift occur? And
more importantly to fishermen, no doubt, is the question of how
that approach intersects with the current approach where
209. E.g., Elizabeth A. Babcock & Ellen K Pikitch, Can We Reach
Agreement on A Standardized Approach to Ecosystem-Based Fisheries
Management, 74 BULLETIN OF MARINE SCIENCE 685 passim (2004).
210. ECOSYSTEM PRINCIPLES ADVISORY PANEL, ECOSYSTEM-BASED
MANAGEMENT 1 (1998), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/EPA
Prpt.pdf.
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fishermen with their recorded catch histories get slotted into one
particular fishery, often to the exclusion of participation in all
others. Ecosystem-based fisheries management could introduce
the allocation battle for all time.
E. Amendment 16 reveals the limited capacity for self-governance
that exists in many of New England's fisheries.
One of the major premises of the Amendment 16 FMP sector
management is that the program can introduce more regulatory
flexibility into the fisheries management system without
compromising achievement of the biological and other
management objectives of the fishery. 211 One of the ways this
flexibility can be leveraged is through the active cooperation of
sector members with each other within a sector: Where are the
fish located? Are there species there that need to be avoided? Are
there other spots where members are fishing that have fewer
unwanted species present? What is the best technique for rigging
a net to avoid bycatch?
These are the sorts of questions that sector members are
actually well positioned to focus on using their new sector
managers as conduits; sectors can begin behaving as learning
institutions for the mutual benefit of the sector's membership.
Such an approach, however, runs squarely into the New England
fishermen stereotype, that is, the notion that New England
fishermen are not only unaccustomed to working together for a
common purpose, but affirmatively unwilling to do so, particularly
when it comes to competition for landings. It will be important to
watch whether the competition-free dynamic between and among
sector members can begin to provide incentives for cooperation,
leading to greater profitability of the fisheries and more flexibility
in the regulatory controls.
Many leading social researchers, including Nobel Laureate
Dr. Elinor Ostrum, have studied the theory of common-property
management and institutions for decades. These researchers
argue that community-based fisheries have a rich history in many
parts of the world and may well be the wave of the future.212 But,
211. E.g., New Bedford, 2011 WL 2636863, at *4.
212. E.g., Donald R. Leal, Community-Run Risheries: Avoiding the
"Tragedy of the Commons," PROP. & ENVTL. RES. CENTER (Sept. 1996),
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as Dr. Ostrum has concluded, "[i]f we are to move beyond the work
of [Garrett] Hardin, we need to begin to specify the conditions that
are conducive to the emergence of coordinated, rather than
independent, actions by the individual users of a [common
property resource]." 213 It is too early to speculate whether the
sector management system, with the right incentives,
encouragement, and external support, could provide those
conditions and certainly the first fishing year under sectors was
more about survival than anything else. Nevertheless, CLF
believes the signs are encouraging.214
VII. OUR FRIEND, THE ATLANTIC COD
The Amendment 16 FMP, we hope, will be a turning point for
both the fish and fishermen of New England. It is too early to tell
and a great deal of heavy lifting lies before the New England
Fishery Management Council. It is important, however, to keep
the biological goals of Amendment 16 in context. Estimates by
researchers at the University of New Hampshire, using very
accurate landings data for the original commercial fisheries that
developed out of the New England ports, indicate that current
Atlantic cod populations are only a tiny fraction of what they were
140 years ago, perhaps on the order of five to six percent of those
earlier populations. 215  These historical studies indicate, for
example, that two to three times the number of Atlantic cod that
were landed from the entire Gulf of Maine in 2007 were caught by
coastal boats just within the thirty-two kilometers of the Maine
coast between Penobscot Bay and Grand Manan 140 years ago.216
Today, there is no cod fishery between Penobscot Bay and Grand
http://www.perc.org/ articles/article652.php.
213. Elinor Ostrom, The Rudiments of a Theory of the Origins, Survival,
and Performance of Common-Property Institutions, in MAKING THE COMMONS
WORK: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 297 (David W. Bromley et al. eds.,
1992) (This volume contains a treasure trove of information as well as
extensive references to the common property management literature).
214. This may be particularly true for the smaller scale day boats and
coastal fishermen. The larger offshore-capable trip boats are already talking
about continuing on to an IFQ system, which might fits their needs better at
lower transactional cost.
215. Karen Alexander et al., Gulf of Maine Cod in 1861: Historical
Analysis of Fishery Logbooks, with Ecosystem Implications, 10 FISH &
FISHERIES 428, 444 (2009).
216. Id.
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Manan. It is also important to remember that, while the scientific
projections are that Georges Bank Atlantic cod will be rebuilt by
2026 if overfishing does not recur, the estimated rebuilt
population will still be well below historical levels.217
This decline is not all due to fishing. Dams, pollution and
other human coastal activities have certainly degraded the
conditions that used to support that massive population of cod in
eastern Maine and Atlantic Canada. And other species and biota
have subsequently moved into the ecosystem to fill the hole left by
the massive declines of Atlantic cod. But the differential between
now and then does say a lot about how hard this marine resource
has been pummeled over the years and bears some hope that cod
might once again return to Penobscot Bay and Frenchman's Bay
and other coastal areas if we start to manage the resource
intelligently. The gap between now and then also provides silent
ecological testimony against those, including politicians, who
continue to promote "short-term" overharvesting of Atlantic cod so
that the industry can immediately return more dollars of haddock
fillets even at the expense of attaining long-term fishery objectives
as quickly as possible. 218
A shortsighted mentality surely does not do much good for
Atlantic cod recovery, and it does even less for those who would
like to see Atlantic cod restored to some semblance of its former
stature in the food web. In the end, CLF continues to believe that
a healthy, biologically diverse marine ecosystem in the Gulf of
Maine with all endemic stocks restored to and maintained at a
217. See id.
218. See Conservation Law Found. v. Franklin, 989 F.2d 54 (1993); see
also Memorandum of Amici Curiae Representatives Barney Frank and John
Tierney in Support of the Plaintiffs and Prospective-Intervenor on Cross-
Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 143; Brief, Amici Curiae, Filed
by Attorney General Martha Coakley on Behalf of Deval Patrick as the
Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Paul Diodati as the
Director of the Division of Marine Fisheries for the Commonwealth, supra
note 143. NMFS estimates that if the nation's fisheries were all rebuilt, there
could be on the order of a $31 billion increase in fish sales, 500,000 new jobs,
and $2.2 billion more in revenues to fishermen, their families and their
communities. See Eric Schwaab, Assistant National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration Administrator, Remarks for the International Boston Seafood
Show: The Future for the American Seafood Industry (March 21, 2011),
available at http://www.nero.noaa.gov/nero/nr/nrdoc/l1/SchwaabBoston_
SeafoodShowFinal_3-21.pdf.
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maximum spawning stock biomass, rather than a single species,
mono-crop harvesting approach, will ultimately provide the
maximum benefits to the Nation and to the region's fishermen and
their communities. The re-authorized Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act and the Amendment 16 FMP
appear to have put this region firmly on that path.
